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Abstract
A cryptocurrency is a decentralized digital currency that is designed for secure and private asset
transfer and storage. As a currency, it should be difficult to counterfeit and double-spend. In this paper,
we review and analyze the major security and privacy issues of Bitcoin. In particular, we focus on its
underlying foundation, blockchain technology. First, we present a comprehensive background of Bitcoin
and the preliminary on security. Second, the major security threats and countermeasures of Bitcoin
are investigated. We analyze the risk of double-spending attacks, evaluate the probability of success
in performing the attacks and derive the profitability for the attacker to perform such attacks. Third,
we analyze the underlying Bitcoin peer-to-peer network security risks and Bitcoin storage security. We
compare three types of Bitcoin wallets in terms of security, type of services and their trade-offs. Finally,
we discuss the security and privacy features of alternative cryptocurrencies and present an overview of
emerging technologies today. Our results can help Bitcoin users to determine a trade-off between the risk
of double-spending attempts and the transaction time delay or confidence before accepting transactions.
These results can also assist miners to develop suitable strategies to get involved in the mining process
and maximize their profits.
Index Terms
Cryptocurrency, digital assets, Bitcoin, blockchain, double-spending.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cryptocurrency is a decentralized online currency that was developed as an alternate means to
transfer money in an unprecedented way. Existing financial systems require a centralized trusted financial
institution to securely process transactions between two parties. This institution charges costly service
fees that are unavoidable for banking customers. In addition to such cost burdens, delayed processing
time and security issues have affected the modern-day financial industry. Certain transactions, such as
funds transfer, may take days or weeks to be cleared, causing issues in cases of urgency. The modern-day
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2financial system is also plagued with security and privacy vulnerabilities. Financial institutions employ
the most advanced security techniques to protect customers. However, the sensitive information of the
customer is always exposed to the financial institutions making it vulnerable to information leakage. To
mitigate these security concerns, privacy risks, and inconveniences, new cryptographic protocols have
been developed to allow secure and convenient asset transfer, without involving a centralized third-party.
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto developed a white paper in which he proposed Bitcoin [1]. Bitcoin is
an online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) digital cash system that does not require a trusted third-party. In Bitcoin,
users possess ownership rights to virtual cryptocoins that are denoted as Bitcoins (BTC). Users generate
transactions to transfer BTC and store them in the public ledger, blockchain. The smallest transferable
value today is known as a Satoshi, which is equivalent to one-hundredth of a millionth BTC (i.e.
0.00000001 BTC).
Bitcoin transactions utilize cryptographic protocols to provide a secure process while striving to
preserve the privacy of both the buyer and seller. The transactions are stored in a blockchain [2]–[5] to
limit inherent issues of digital media such as double-spending [6]. A blockchain is a distributed database
acting as a public ledger that holds all processed transactions. It is based on a distributed consensus that
allows any past and present online transaction to be verified [7].
Bitcoin transactions are released into the network and validated by the nodes as they propagate through
the entire network. The validating nodes, referred to as miners, compete to mine groups of transactions
into blocks and earn BTC as a reward. Mining is the process of solving a hard cryptopuzzle, referred
to as the Proof-of-Work (PoW), that requires extensive computational power. The first miner capable of
finding a solution to the problem broadcasts his/her block to the network and earns the reward. The
reward consists of a specified amount of new released BTC and all the transaction fees associated with
the transactions included in the block. All the other miners then surrender to the solution of the winning
miner and append the winning block to the blockchain.
The first Bitcoin software was implemented by Satoshi Nakamoto and is known as the Bitcoin Core.
This implementation is sometimes referred to as the Satoshi client and is run by most of the network
nodes in Bitcoin. It is an open source project with a large developer community contributing to it. The
developers follow a Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIP) [8] document and introduce the standards of
the system. The document also contains new features and proposals for the developer community to test
thoroughly before making final modifications to the software.
Following Bitcoin, many cryptocurrency systems appeared and continue to do so today. The blockchain
technology is a common characteristic shared by many newly emerging cryptocurrency systems [9]. The
majority of these systems are mainly clones of Bitcoin. These systems introduced only minor adjustments
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3such as currency supply or block size within the Blockchain. Alternatively, a few systems introduce
innovative concepts that offer substantial features. Examples of these features include novel consensus
mechanisms or enhanced decentralized computing platforms that can provide additional functions and
higher flexibility to the system.
All cryptocurrencies are traded in the online cryptocurrency marketplace. The cryptocurrency market
is similar to other exchange markets such as the stock market, with various trading platforms. However,
the cryptocurrency market is not regulated by a government or agency and trading occurs virtually 24/7
across the world. The nature of cryptocurrency allows transactions to occur at speeds that cannot be
accomplished with fiat currency, such as the United States dollar. This results in a much more volatile
market than traditional trading markets. Coin prices are continuously rising and dropping, and new
cryptocurrencies consistently enter and leave the marketplace. Many coins continue to rise in value based
on value demonstrated to investors. However, increased speculation in the marketplace has lead to the
over-evaluation of many cryptocurrencies.
As of November 2017, the total market cap of the cryptocurrency market hit $246 billion [10]. This
amount comes from the total valuation of almost one thousand cryptocurrencies on the market today.
Comparing this amount to the $17.6 billion total market cap in 2016, the market has increased by 1,298%.
This rapid growth in the new market has led an effort to examine the role of cryptocurrency in the future.
A. Contributions
Cryptocurrencies, particularly Bitcoin, have attracted massive and diverse attention. They are in contin-
uous development and evolution thrusting researchers to thoroughly and constantly analyze them. Notable
studies have been presented that discuss the blockchain technology and outline open issues. Their main
purpose is to exploit the future stability of Bitcoin from different perspectives. The study presented in [11]
is one of the first studies to present an exposition of Bitcoin and some altcoins. This work focused on
discussing stability properties and comparing them to those in Bitcoin, to measure its degree of stability
as a system. It also briefly investigated security and privacy concerns, in addition to some alternative
consensus protocols. However, the study lacks recently investigated attacks and deep analysis behind
them. It is also limited in its discussions about the alternative protocols. The survey presented in [12]
is a technical analysis on Bitcoin and aimed at consolidating key algorithmic features of the system.
This work expanded on the study in [11] by providing an in-depth analysis in terms of security and
privacy. However, the authors briefly discuss Bitcoin storage wallets and do not delve into the underlying
infrastructure that secures these wallets. The study presented in [13] is another comprehensive survey that
explored various security and privacy aspects of Bitcoin, accompanied with possible countermeasures.
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4The survey presents comparisons between various security attacks and privacy protocols. Nevertheless,
as in [12], Bitcoin storage wallet types are briefly compared without exploiting their foundation that
reflects points of weakness. Another privacy-focused research is presented in [14] that aims at expanding
the previous works in terms of anonymity and privacy. In this study, the authors show that analyzing
anonymity and privacy in Bitcoin may be classified into various classes where each class may result in
a different privacy leakage outcomes. They also classify the on-going efforts to improve anonymity and
privacy while discussing their potential corresponding outcomes.
While the main purpose of this paper is similar to the previous studies; to examine the potential
stability of Bitcoin, however, we strive to approach this goal by considering missing and limited previously
discussed topics. We delve deeper into analyzing the double-spending attacks by modeling the probability
of success in multiple ways. In particular, utilizing our analysis, we present our own profitability analysis
of the double-spending attacks. We reveal a break-point in time when attackers should give up on the
attack since it is unlikely that they will turn a profit beyond this point (i.e. the time when the cost is
greater than the revenue). We present a trade-off between the waiting time before accepting a transaction
versus the profits/losses of the attackers. This may help maximize the confidence of the users before
accepting transactions. In addition to this, we thoroughly analyze the infrastructure of Bitcoin storage
wallets. Our discussion presents the key algorithmic features introduced by each wallet type in order
to counter the different potential threats. The main purpose is to enlighten the users with the trade-offs
when using different types of wallets from a cryptographic perspective.
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We provide a comprehensive explanation of the primary components of Bitcoin discussed in a
sequential and logical order for the readers to comprehend. The main purpose is to cultivate the
readers with the necessary background on Bitcoin to consolidate their understanding of the system.
We aim at providing sufficient background for the readers to build a solid understanding that can
be utilized when exploring similar systems. This background will also help the readers easily digest
the following concerns and issues discussed in this paper.
2) We delve thoroughly into the analysis of double-spending attacks. We first show that the probability
of success of performing double-spending attacks can be modeled using two distinct probabilistic
models. We show that both models result in a similar outcome. Next, using these probabilistic models,
we present a profitability analysis on performing double-spending attacks. The main purpose of this
analysis is to reflect the trade-off between the waiting time before accepting a transaction versus
the profits/losses of the attackers. We also aim at reflecting that attackers with 51% computational
power or more will continue to profit indefinitely.
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
53) We present fundamental network security and privacy concerns. The purpose of this analysis is to
expand the knowledge of readers on major security and privacy concerns that threaten the stability
of systems running the blockchain technology. Our target is to help the reader realize the major
threats to such systems from a security and privacy perspective.
4) We dive deeply into the exploration of Bitcoin storage wallets. We first classify wallets based on their
underlying infrastructure and methods of PKI pair generation. We aim at presenting the cryptographic
primitives related to each type of wallet. Next, we classify wallets based on installation environments
and then further classify them based on functionality. We strive to help the readers understand the
different classes of wallets, their corresponding security risks, and the best practices to secure their
cryptocoins.
The interest in blockchain continues to grow aggressively. It has already attracted a wide range of
audiences such as governments, enterprises, health-care, and many more. We realize that in order for
blockchain to sustain its success and for these interested entities to adopt it, we must educate a wider
range of audience, which could include: (i) researchers at the beginning of the line that wish to expand
on research in this area and (ii) skeptical entities and individuals that wish to adopt the technology and
wish to learn more about it. We aim at putting together a comprehensive study that explores blockchain
technology from multiple angles and filling in the gaps of previous studies.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review previous digital cash
systems and blockchain infrastructures. In Section III, we provide a comprehensive background review
on Bitcoin outlining its building blocks and protocols. Next, in Section IV, we evaluate double-spending
attacks and present our profitability analysis. Following that, in Section V, we assess the major network
security attacks of the Bitcoin network. In Section VI, we analyze the security issues in the storage
wallets used by Bitcoin today. We investigate the subsequent privacy protocols of Bitcoin in an effort to
limit the linkage problem in Section VII. In Section VIII, we review protocols and alternative consensus
algorithms implemented in emerging cryptocurrencies outlining the security and privacy advantages and
limitations. Finally, we conclude our study, summarize the lessons learned, and future research directions
in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the history of digital cash systems. We also introduce the evolution of the
blockchain technology.
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6A. Digital Cash Systems
Research in digital cash dates back to the early 1980s [15]. In 1990, DigiCash Inc., an electronic
cash corporation, made an initial attempt to provide a cryptocurrency system [16]. DigiCash transactions
involved cryptographic protocols and aimed at providing its users with anonymity. However,it failed in
2000 as the Internet bubble popped despite being attractive initially. David Chaum, its founder, believes
the failure of DigiCash to succeed was tied to its technology which preceded the e-commerce maturation
within the Internet. Other reasons which led to its failure included the cooperation of banks to process
a transaction, making DigiCash a centralized system.
In 1998, a decentralized digital cash system, b-money [17], was introduced by Wei Dai. B-money is
an anonymous and distributed digital cash system that aimed at providing untraceable transactions. One
major advantage of this system is that it eliminates the need for a central authority. However, b-money
was just an initial and incomplete idea. It did not properly tackle some of the key issues including
double-spending attacks.
In early 2000, Digital Gold Currency (DGC), a currency backed by gold, gained some popularity. DGC
is considered to be a second-generation digital currency. It is issued by some companies that enable users
to pay each other in units similar to those of gold bullion. Examples include iGolder, gbullion, and
e-Gold. Although DGC seemed to have a bright future, it lost popularity due to its centralized structure.
Politics may have also played a role in its declining popularity. Companies that provided DGC were
forced to shut down by the federal government due to their inability to comply with the government
regulations [18].
In 2003, Second Life [19], an online virtual world, introduced a digital currency referred to as the
Linden dollar. The Linden dollar is exchangeable for fiat currencies. Second Life users are able to use this
currency for direct transactions. However, similar to its preceding digital currencies, the Linden dollar is
a centralized digital currency that is controlled by its creator, Linden Labs [20]. Moreover, its price is
volatile and unstable making it a risky currency to own.
B. Blockchain History
In 1991, the first secure blockchain was proposed by Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta [2]. Their
blockchain aimed at certifying the creation or modification of a digital record by digitally time-stamping
the record being processed. However, the blockchain was not efficient since each record was independently
time-stamped. To improve the efficiency, Merkle trees [21] were incorporated into blockchains in 1992 [3].
They improved the efficiency by handling multiple digital records into one block. Finally, Satoshi
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7Nakamoto implemented the first real blockchain and used it as the core technology for the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency system.
III. UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN
In this section, we will present the major building blocks and protocols of Bitcoin. We first present the
Bitcoin network, Bitcoin transaction, and Bitcoin transaction standards. Next, we explain how Merkle trees
are utilized to group transactions into blocks and stored in the blockchain. Following that, we discuss
the Bitcoin mining process, mining pools, payment methods, and methods of developing alternative
cryptocurrencies.
A. The Bitcoin Network
Bitcoin runs over a P2P network. The main advantage of using a P2P network is the agile movement
of data for all nodes to achieve consensus. In contrast to the typical P2P network used to share data files
between interested peers, Bitcoin utilizes the network to rapidly broadcast data among all the connected
nodes. This process is known as flooding and continues until all nodes within the network receive the
broadcast data.
It is important to differentiate between the terms node and peer of a P2P network. A node is a network
entity that is connected to one or multiple other similar nodes. The directly connected nodes are referred
to as the peers. Nodes propagate data to the indirectly connected nodes by traversing it to their peers
which follow a similar manner until the data reaches every connected node.
In the Bitcoin network, data being flooded includes IP addresses of the nodes, newly generated
transactions, and blocks of verified transactions that extend the blockchain. Peers share IP addresses
of other nodes that they are connected to or have discovered from their peer nodes. The aim behind
sharing IP addresses is to allow peers in the network to discover and connect to more nodes resulting in
a random network topology. Newly generated transactions are broadcast through the network to rapidly
publicize their occurrence to all connected nodes. Miners compete to mine these transactions into blocks.
The winning miner broadcasts the block to all the connected nodes to extend and update their version
of the blockchain.
Nodes in the Bitcoin P2P network are defined based on their roles. The main duties are summarized as
transaction generation, block/transaction routing, block/transaction verification, and transaction mining.
Block/transaction routing is performed by all nodes.
A node that can perform all functions is referred to as a full node. It consistently keeps a copy of the
full blockchain allowing it to verify any transaction without needing assistance of other connected nodes.
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the node. Moreover, a full node possesses computational resources to compete in the mining competition.
Nodes that do not store a full copy of the blockchain are referred to as Simplified Payment Verification
(SPV) nodes or lightweight nodes. These nodes require assistance from full nodes when verifying a
transaction. Full nodes feed the SPV nodes with the required information from the blockchain necessary
to complete the transaction verification.
Some nodes may only perform one particular function. Ones that are engaged in the mining process
are referred to as mining nodes while others that generate transactions are referred to as wallets.
In most Bitcoin software implementations, all nodes are treated equally and can be uniquely identified
by their IP addresses. Using these addresses, peers establish Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
connections with one another. Each node can choose whether to connect to the network using a public
or private IP. A node that utilizes a public IP is accessible over the Internet by any connected node while
one with a private IP is only accessible by nodes within its private network. By default, a node with a
public IP address is granted 8 outbound connections and 117 inbound connections, resulting in a total
of 125 connections. On the other hand, a node with a private IP address is granted only 8 outbound
connections. An outbound connection is initiated by the node itself when it requests connecting to a
discoverable node while an inbound connection is initiated by other nodes in the network that desire
connecting to the node.
For explanation purposes, we define the node that initiates a connection as client and the node that waits
for an incoming connection as server. Both nodes engage in a TCP handshake by exchanging network
packets defined as version and verack. The client initiates a connection request by sending a version
packet addressed to the IP address of the server. By default, the server listens on port 8333 for incoming
version packets. If the server accepts the version packet, it responds with a verack packet and its own
version packet, both addressed to the IP address of the client. Finally, the client responds by sending a
verack packet addressed to the IP address of the server and the connection is established. The connection
enables symmetric communication allowing the client and server to exchange data bidirectionally. The
connection is lost if peers do not communicate for a specified idle time. To reconnect, peers engage in
a new TCP handshake.
As discussed previously, a node shares with its peers a list of IP addresses that it has learned as a
result of being connected to the network. Each node stores its list in two separate tables: a tried table
and a new table. The tried table of a node stores IP addresses that the node has established connections
with while its new table stores IP addresses that it has only discovered but did not attempt to connect
to yet. When a node desires sharing IP addresses with its peers, it randomly selects IP addresses from
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of 1000 IP addresses of the total IP addresses stored in both tables. To initiate sharing, a node sends a
getaddr message to its peers requesting them to share their lists of IP addresses. The peers then respond
with an addr message. In some cases, sharing IP addresses is unsolicited if a node voluntarily sends an
addr messages to its peers without receiving a getaddr message.
A node that wishes to connect to the Bitcoin network for the first time cannot obtain IP addresses by
this method. Bootstrapping is mainly achieved by communicating with a Domain Name Server (DNS)
seeder. The node sends a DNS query requesting a list of active IP addresses. If the DNS fails to respond
with an appropriate list of active IP addresses, the node can still connect to the network by using a
hard-coded list of IP addresses, referred to as seeds. Once connected to any of these IP addresses, the
node can then request more IP addresses from its peers by sending getaddr messages.
Nodes also relay verified transactions and blocks to their peers to reach consensus. A node begins
by broadcasting an inventory (inv) message to all its peers informing them of the new transactions or
blocks it has received and verified. The peer nodes check whether they are already informed of these new
transactions and blocks then respond to the node with a getdata message. The getdata message includes
all the transactions and blocks a peer node is not aware of. The node then responds with a transaction/block
message that includes the complete transactions/blocks the peer requests. Once received, the peer validates
the transactions or blocks and continues to relay them to its own peers in a similar manner. If a received
transaction or block cannot be validated, it is immediately dropped and its propagation is discontinued.
B. Bitcoin Transactions
We define a Bitcoin transaction (TX) as the transfer of an amount of BTC ownership rights from the
wallet of the buyer to the wallet of the seller, in exchange for a product or service. BTC wallets utilize
elliptic curve digital signatures to handle the transfer of ownership rights and ensure that unauthorized
spending of the cryptocurrency is infeasible. Each wallet randomly generates a private key Pr which
is used to derive its corresponding public key Pub that is shared among all users. The Pub is used to
generate the address of the wallet needed to make payments to it while the Pr is used to generate a
digital signature corresponding to the Pub in order to claim payments made to the wallet and use them
in later transactions. A Pr is first generated from a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (CSPRNG) and its corresponding Pub is then calculated using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). Calculations are performed based on the field and curve parameters defined by
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secp256k1 with the curve order n [22] as follows
Pr = CSPRNG(), (1)
Pub = Pr ×G (mod n), (2)
where G is a generator of the elliptic curve and × represents elliptic curve multiplication.
The BTC wallet of the buyer assembles a transaction using the Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO)
of the buyer stored in the blockchain. An UTXO specifies an amount of BTC claimed earlier by the
buyer as a result of a previously processed transaction. A simple BTC transaction is shown in Fig. 1.
In the figure, we show that a transaction can consist of multiple inputs and outputs. The output UTXOpay
represents the transfer of ownership rights of a certain amount of BTC from the wallet of the buyer to
the wallet of the seller. The output UTXOch represents redirecting ownership rights of the BTC change
amount back to the wallet of the buyer. A distinct locking script is attached to each of these outputs
which specifies conditions that must be met in order to grant ownership rights. For example, the locking
script attached to UTXOpay must include the Pub of the seller needed to generate his/her wallet address.
This ensures that the payment is made to the wallet of the seller and only he/she is granted access to it
with his/her corresponding Pr. Using Pr, the seller can generate a digital signature that corresponds to
the Pub associated with the locking script, hence claim the output.
The inputs {UTXO1,UTXO2, · · · ,UTXOn} represent unspent transaction outputs claimed by the buyer
from previous transactions. When a buyer decides to use a specific output from a previous transaction as
an input to a new transaction, the buyer must specify proof that he/she still possesses ownership rights
and did not previously spend them in another transaction. This is done by attaching an unlocking script
to each input. The unlocking script solves the locking script that was associated with the output from
the previous transaction. Likewise, the unlocking script is a digital signature produced by the Pr of the
buyer that corresponds to a Pub associated with the locking script of an UTXO. A valid unlocking script
is legitimate proof of continuous possession of ownership rights to certain BTC being used as input.
As a result, BTC can be viewed as a chain of digitally signed transactions where ownership rights are
transferred from one owner to the other by digitally signing them.
A transaction must include at least one input, however, may include multiple outputs to simultaneously
pay different sellers from the total value associated with the inputs. The locking script of each output
would specify the conditions of its claimer. However, it is necessary that the total BTC value of the
inputs is always equal to or greater than the total value of the outputs. In the event that the total value
of the inputs is greater than the total outputs, the difference, known as the transaction fee, is rewarded
to the miner that adds the transaction into a block attached to the blockchain. For guaranteed processing,
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Inputs Outputs
+
UTXOa
UTXOb
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Script
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Script
Unlocking 
Script
Fig. 1: A single transaction with multiple UTXO inputs and outputs.
most available wallets today derive the transaction fee as a fixed amount of BTC in relation to the size
of the transaction. In other words, the transaction fee increases with the size of the transaction.
The wallet of the user combines all the transaction inputs/outputs and their corresponding scripts into
one digital message M. It then applies the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA256 to M twice to increase security
before releasing it into the network. The 32 byte digest representing the identity of the transaction (IDTX)
is generated as follows
IDTX = SHA256 (SHA256(M)) . (3)
A newly generated transaction assembled by the BTC wallet of a buyer is released into the Bitcoin
network to be validated and stored in the blockchain. The generating node transfers the transaction to
its peers which flood it to the rest of the network nodes. Each node that receives it audits the inputs
by executing the scripts associated with it. This audit involves checking whether the execution of the
unlocking script integrated by a buyer within each input matches its corresponding locking script defined
in the previous transaction. If a match exists, the node relays the transaction to its peers and temporarily
places it in its transaction pool until chosen to be mined, otherwise, the transaction is dropped.
In some cases, transactions are not flooded into the network in the same order they are generated. As
a result, during the audit, a node might not be aware of some inputs of a transaction (child transaction)
referring to the outputs of other transactions (parent transactions). Instead of immediately rejecting the
transaction and considering its inputs as invalid, the node can temporarily place it into an orphan
transaction pool. If the parent transaction shows up, the inputs of the child transaction become valid
and it can be transferred to the transaction pool.
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C. Bitcoin Transaction Standards
Currently, there are five Bitcoin transaction standards and a few non-standard transactions. All trans-
action types are generated with a stack-based scripting language that is processed from left to right. A
script consists of a list of instructions that must be executed in the correct order to grant an individual
the right to spend the BTC within a transaction. The list of standards is described below.
Pay to Public Key Hash (P2PKH): This standard transaction is the most used type. The locking script
within each output of a transaction holds the public key hash (serving as a Bitcoin address) of the seller
that will claim the BTC amount included. In other words, the locking script defines a condition that
the seller must possess a specific Pr corresponding to the public key hash to claim the output. Once
claimed by the seller, the output becomes an UTXO owned by the seller. In order for the seller to use
this specific UTXO as an input to a future transaction, the seller must attach a valid unlocking script to
it. The unlocking script includes the Pub of the seller and a digital signature generated by his/her Pr that
corresponds to the public key hash associated with the locking script of the previous transaction output.
Pay to Public Key: The intent behind this standard transaction is to simplify the P2PKH standard. Rather
than associating the public key hash within the locking script of the output, the public key itself is used.
As a result, the validation process is simple. The digital signature of the seller generated with a Pr can
immediately be compared to the associated Pub by searching whether or not they match.
Multi-signature (MultiSig): In this standard transaction, a combination of keys is required to authorize
an output claim. The locking script of a transaction output is associated with a number (N ) of public
keys. In order for an individual to claim the output, the individual must possess M -of-N private keys that
correspond to the N public keys. This type of transaction can increase the security and can be used in
scenarios which require more than one user to be present in order to claim and spend BTC. However, as
the number N of public keys associated with the transaction output increases, the size of the transaction
also increases. As a result, these transactions acquire large space in the UTXO pool, therefore requiring
more storage memory. As discussed previously, larger transactions also require larger transaction fees.
Pay to Script Hash (P2SH): This standard transaction was introduced to resolve the complex issues caused
by MultiSig transactions. The transaction has the same simple complexity as a P2PKH transaction. Rather
than associating the entire locking script with a transaction output that includes multiple public keys,
a double hash computation is applied to the entire script, specifically SHA256
(
RIPEMD160(script)
)
.
The result is a 20-byte digest that is attached to the locking script instead of the entire original script.
In order to use the output from this transaction as an input to another transaction, the buyer creates an
unlocking script that holds M -of-N private keys and the original script that was cryptographically hashed
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earlier. In that way, sufficient information is available in the locking and unlocking scripts to validate the
UTXO for spending. In addition, the buyer no longer has to worry about generating large transactions
which might require hefty transaction fees to process. Instead, only the seller is required to provide the
unlocking script he/she wishes to spend the output in a new transaction.
Data Output: This standard transaction is intended to store arbitrary data on the blockchain rather than
transfer BTC from a buyer to a seller. In the Bitcoin community, many members believe that such
transactions are abusive to the system since it places a burden on the network nodes to process transactions
that do not carry BTC. However, such transactions exist and allow 40 bytes of data to be stored per
transaction. These transactions are un-spendable, therefore are not stored in the UTXO set.
Non-Standard: A very small percentage of transactions are processed under non-standard transactions.
Non-standard transactions use more sophisticated scripts that strive to provide higher complexity and
security. In some cases, these transactions might even be the result of bugs or mistakes resulting in loss
of BTC.
D. Merkle Trees
Validated transactions are grouped into blocks which are then mined and stored in the blockchain. A
single block can contain multiple transactions up to the block size limit. Merkle trees, sometimes referred
to as hash trees, are utilized to cluster multiple transactions in one block.
A Merkle tree is a tree data structure generated in a bottom-up approach that can efficiently summarize
and verify the integrity of the transactions being combined. Starting from the leaf nodes which are hashes
of the original data, each non-leaf node is generated as a computation of its respective children nodes.
For a single non-leaf node, all its children nodes are concatenated then hashed to produce a single digest
that represents the node in the tree. This approach continues until a single node is generated which is
defined as the root node.
BTC utilizes a binary Merkle tree in which each non-leaf node has exactly two children. It applies a
double hash computation SHA256 (SHA256(·)) when generating nodes. The leaf nodes used to construct
the tree are the identities IDTX generated for each transaction as discussed in equation (3).
In a binary Merkle tree, each row within the tree consists of an even number of nodes, except the root
node. In the case where a row consists of an odd number of nodes, a replica of the last node is reproduced
to even out the number of nodes in that row. To better comprehend the construction of the binary Merkle
tree, consider a block that consists of five transactions, {TX1,TX2, · · · ,TX5}. Each one of these transac-
tions has already been validated by the nodes and an identity for each transaction has been generated as
discussed in equation (3). We denote the corresponding identities as {IDTX1 , IDTX2 , · · · , IDTX5}, where
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each identity represents a leaf node in the tree. In this example, the number of nodes at the leaf node level
is odd, therefore a replica of the fifth identity is generated, {IDTX1 , IDTX2 , · · · , IDTX5 , IDTX6 = IDTX5}.
Next, the double hash computation is applied to the concatenation of each two identities to generate the
parent non-leaf nodes of the Merkle tree as follows
N1 = SHA256
(
SHA256(IDTX1‖IDTX2)
)
, (4)
N2 = SHA256
(
SHA256(IDTX3‖IDTX4)
)
, (5)
N3 = SHA256
(
SHA256(IDTX5‖IDTX6)
)
, (6)
where ‖ is the concatenation of two identities.
As shown in the previous equations, an odd number of non-leaf nodes is generated at that level. To
even it out, we replicate N3 to produce N4 as
N4 = SHA256
(
SHA256(IDTX5‖IDTX6)
)
. (7)
Using the resulting digests we can generate the following level of non-leaf nodes as
N5 = SHA256
(
SHA256(N1‖N2)
)
, (8)
N6 = SHA256
(
SHA256(N3‖N4)
)
. (9)
Finally, the 32 bytes root node is derived as
R = SHA256
(
SHA256(N5‖N6)
)
. (10)
Fig. 2 represents the complete construction of the Merkle tree for this example. The dotted nodes
represent the replicated nodes that are added to even out the odd rows. The root node, R, representing
the summary of all transactions is placed into the block header of a block to be mined and chained to
the blockchain.
The use of Merkle trees is more common in SPV nodes since they do not store a copy of the full
blockchain. When an SPV node needs proof to the existence of a transaction within a block, it turns to a
full node for assistance. The full node will generate a merkle path by computing a maximum of log2N
SHA256
(
SHA256(·)) computations, where N represents the total number of transactions in the tree.
Using the Merkle path as an authentication path, the SPV node can prove the existence of a transaction
within the tree. This proof of existence method is considered to be efficient since it only requires hash
computations.
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Fig. 2: A Merkle tree within a block.
E. Blockchain
The blockchain is a public ledger that stores all previous transactions since the creation of Bitcoin. It
provides its users with transaction confirmations to track ownership rights of BTC. As new transactions
are processed, the blockchain is extended. It consists of blocks {B0,B1, · · · ,Bn}, each carrying a set
of validated transactions, where B0 represents the first block and Bn represents the most recent block
attached to the blockchain. Blocks are linked back-to-back, with each one referencing its previous block
to form the complete blockchain. To reference a block, a unique 32 byte identity IDBi is generated for
Bi by applying SHA256
(
SHA256(·)) to the block header. An identity is referred to as the block hash.
The head of the blockchain is denoted as B0 and is defined as the genesis block. B0 differs from all
the other blocks as it does not reference any previous block. At the launching stage of the system, B0
was a stand-alone block waiting for the system to initiate a new mined block to be chained to it.
Each block consists of two parts, a header, and a body. Each header incorporates the block hash of
its predecessor block in the chain. The header also consists of a difficulty target, nonce, and a time-
stamp which are discussed in more detail in the following subsection. The body carries all the leaf nodes
and non-leaf nodes of the Merkle tree, excluding the Merkle root, which is incorporated in the header.
This design makes it infeasible to retroactively alter records within any block of the blockchain. Any
modification to one block will require adjusting all the subsequent chained blocks.
F. Bitcoin Mining
Bitcoin mining is the final stage to secure validated transactions and add them to the blockchain.
Once a transaction is added to the blockchain, it becomes completely verified and public to all users.
The transaction claimer(s) can use the embedded UTXO(s) as the input to other transactions whenever
desired.
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Miners begin by selecting transactions from their transaction pools that will be placed into a block
where a block cannot exceed 1MB in size. A small portion of that space is specified to carry high priority
transactions. Priority is based on the size and age of the transaction inputs. The rest of the block is filled
with other transactions which have greater transaction fees to maximize the profit that a miner can turn
if successful in mining the block first. A transaction with low or no fees will probably remain in the
transaction pool of the miner until it ages and becomes a high priority transaction.
Next, the miner assembles a special transaction, known as the coinbase transaction. This transaction is
a reward paying transaction to the miner in the event of winning a mining competition. It does not have
any inputs and consists of a single output addressed to the wallet of the miner. The amount incorporated
in the output is the reward mining fee (12.5 BTC at the time of writing) plus the sum of all transaction
fees included in each transaction.
All the selected transactions along with the coinbase transaction are then combined into a Merkle tree
as discussed previously. At this point, the miner has all the components needed to construct the block
header of the new block except the nonce. The nonce is a value which if concatenated with the block
header of the group of chosen transactions and then double hashed, it produces a digest with a specific
prefix of zeros in its binary representation. Searching for this value is performed in a brute-force manner
and is directly correlated with the computational power available. The more available computational
power, the faster a miner is able to find the correct nonce. A successful miner will then broadcast his/her
proof-of-work to prove that he/she consumed computational resources in order to find the correct nonce.
The primary advantage of the proof-of-work is to make it computationally infeasible to perform Sybil
attacks [23]. This process is intentionally designed to be resource-intensive to perform while efficient to
verify that the work has been done. It is required that a certain number of zeros appear in the prefix of
the digest as a result of applying the double SHA256 computation. The prefix determines the difficulty of
finding the correct nonce. The more zeros required in the prefix of the digest, the harder it is to find the
correct nonce and vice versa. The difficulty is dynamically altered every two weeks so that the average
time it takes a miner to find a correct solution is approximately ten minutes. As the number of miners
increases, the difficulty increases, and vice versa.
The first miner to find the correct nonce to a block of transactions is rewarded a mining reward as
compensation for the computational power spent. The mining reward is halved precisely every 210,000
blocks that are added to the blockchain. It is estimated to continue until the year 2140 when nearly 21
million BTC will have been released into the system. The reason for having a fixed supply of BTC is to
prevent price inflation in the future.
Another incentive that encourages miners to spend their computational power to perform mining is the
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transaction fee. The winner is not only rewarded the mining reward but is also given all the transaction
fees incorporated with all the transactions in the block. With time, the mining reward will decrease due
to halving, which will demand higher transaction fees in the future to compensate for the reduced mining
reward.
After a block is successfully mined, all the miners check their transaction pools to eliminate the
transactions that have been included in the mined block and immediately construct a new block of
transactions. The end of the mining race marks the beginning of a new one. Miners instantly begin to
search for the nonce of the next block of transactions.
Simultaneously, the mined block is flooded through the network so that all the nodes can update their
blockchains. The winning miner transmits the block to its peer nodes to validate it before propagating
it further through the network. The peer nodes check whether the block is correctly assembled in terms
of syntax and variables. The proof-of-work provided by the miner must be correct and the coinbase
transaction must include the correct amount to pay the miner. If any information is invalid, the block is
immediately dropped.
Quite regularly, as blocks are mined to extend the blockchain, a temporary incident, known as a fork,
might occur. A fork occurs when two miners are able to simultaneously mine two different blocks at
the same time. As a result, both newly mined blocks are accepted to extend the blockchain. The blocks
are flooded into the network and the miners update their version of the blockchain based on the block
they receive first. This results in two valid versions of the blockchain in possession by the miners with
two different paths. However, the miners continue to extend their version of the blockchain regardless
which path they possess. Eventually, one path will grow longer than the other as mining continues. The
path that grows longer is the winner and all nodes immediately discard the other path and update their
blockchain to the longer one. In literature, the blocks that are dropped are known as orphan blocks; valid
blocks that were part of the blockchain at some point.
G. Bitcoin Mining Pools and Payment Methods
Although solo miners can compete in the mining process, the likelihood of a successful return is very
low. This is even the case for solo miners with the most powerful computing machines. As a solution to
this problem, solo miners collaborate in the mining process by joining computational power into mining
pools. Together, they form a large organization with significant computational power that can compete
with the other large entities. The members of the mining pool work together to find the correct nonce for
a candidate block and report the result as one miner, increasing their chances of winning the competition.
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In the event of success, the rewards are split among the participating miners based on the contribution
provided by each.
The concept of a mining pool can be compared to the lottery. Assuming individuals with the same
financial capabilities, if a large group buys tickets together, the individuals within the group have a better
chance of winning than a single individual buying tickets alone. If any ticket owned by the group wins
the lottery, the participating individuals split the reward proportional to the amount invested by each. In a
mining pool, the computational power provided by each solo miner is analogous to the amount invested
by each ticket buyer.
A mining pool is managed by a pool operator who handles the entire pool server and receives a
percentage of the rewards as compensation. The role of the operator is to coordinate the mining performed
by all the participating miners. The operator keeps a continuously updated copy of the entire blockchain
to ease the job of the participating miners. Using the updated blockchain, the operator verifies any
transaction that appears in the network and places it in a candidate block for mining. By that, miners
only need to worry about finding the correct nonce of the candidate block. If the mining pool wins the
competition, the operator divides the rewards among the participating miners.
Reward splitting can be performed in multiple forms and varies from one mining pool to the other. As
described in [24], these methods can be categorized into simple reward, score-based reward, or risk-free
pay-per share reward.
Simple reward systems consist of either proportional systems or Pay-Per Share (PPS) systems. In the
proportional systems, a reward B is split among the participating miners at the end of each round, where
a round is the consecutive time between two successful blocks generated by the pool. The operator keeps
a percentage of the reward fB and divides the remaining (1 − f)B among the miners based on the
shares they submit. Shares are defined as the number of hashes performed by each miner in attempt to
find the correct proof-of-work. A miner that submits n shares from a total of N shares submitted by all
the miners in the pool receives a reward of nN (1− f)B BTC on average. Conversely, the PPS system is
a deterministic one where the miner knows how much reward can be turned in advance. The operator
immediately pays each miner based on the submitted shares regardless of the mining result. In other
words, a miner that submits n shares receives (1− f)pB BTC/share, where p represents the probability
of one share being the correct proof-of-work. In this system, the operator is taking the risk of mining
independently since the miners receive ensured payments whether or not the pool generates a block.
Score-based reward systems come in many forms and strive to prevent miners from pool-hopping.
Pool-hopping is the practice of mining in a pool only during its good times (successfully generating
blocks) and leaving it during its bad times. A pool-hopper can maximize his/her rewards at the expense
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of miners that remain loyal to the pool at all times. The method introduced by Slush [25] is one of the first
implemented score-based systems that extends the proportional method. Rather than paying the miner an
amount based on the submitted shares after each round, the miner is given a score that is proportional
to his/her contribution and increases as more time elapses from the start of the round. The score is used
to calculate the reward share given to the miner at the end of the round. However, this method is still
susceptible to hopping since the score does not consider factors such as the mining difficulty or the
hashrate of the pool. Also, in this method mining at the beginning of a round is more profitable since
there are fewer shares at that time. As a result, the geometric method was introduced to address these
weaknesses. This method introduced a fixed fee, a constant amount taken from the reward of each block,
and a variable fee, a score granted at the beginning of each round to the operator. As time passes, the
variable fee declines, making mining equally profitable throughout the entire round. Shorter rounds result
in larger variable fees and vice versa. By that, there is no advantage to mining early in the round.
Another score-based method is Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS) that exists in different forms. In this
method, the concept of rewarding miners after each round is replaced with rewarding miners that have
been participating in earlier rounds, regardless of the mining result. In other words, the operator pays
miners based on their contributions from previous efforts. Later on, more advanced payment systems
evolved such as the Double Geometric Method (DGM). This system is a hybrid between the PPLNS and
geometric system that combines advantages of both methods.
Some mining pools employ a risk-free pay-per share system. One of the first implemented systems
is known as the Maximum Pay-Per Share (MPPS). It combines both the PPS and proportional systems,
where each participating miner has a balance of each. If the miner submits a share, the PPS balance is
incremented and when the pool successfully generates a block, the proportional balance is incremented.
At pay time, the miner receives the minimum of both balances. This method protects the pool from
taking the risk alone. However, this method is inconsiderate to the miners, since they will always make
less whether the pool is successful or not. In addition to this, the system suffers from pool-hopping.
A solution was later proposed to solve this problem in the Shared Maximum Pay-Per-Share (SMPPS)
system. The miners have a PPS balance which continues to accumulate as the miners are participating.
If a block is found by the pool and there are sufficient funds, the miners are paid based on their PPS
balance. However, if there are no sufficient funds, miners are paid proportional to the available funds
and given credit to be paid later for whatever balance that is owed.
Today, a broad range of mining pools exist that give miners a variety of options when joining pools.
The question most miners would ask is which mining pool is the best to join. The answer here lies in the
preferences of the miners. For example, some miners are not willing to take the risk of not getting paid
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in the event of being unsuccessful in generating a block and would prefer a PPS mining pool. Others
might be willing to take the risk and choose a score-based system for instance, in return for larger profit.
H. Alternative Cryptocurrencies
In literature, alternative cryptocurrencies are known as altcoins, most of which are inspired by Bitcoin.
Altcoins strive to offer innovative features and/or enhanced security/privacy countermeasures in an effort to
compete with Bitcoin. Their development process is based on the level of innovation and security/privacy
countermeasures they present.
The simplest method to develop an altcoin is by forking the open source code of Bitcoin [26] while
adding/modifying any features to it. In software development, a fork is a completely independent project
that exploits a copy of the original source code. A Bitcoin fork generates an entirely new blockchain and
is completely independent of Bitcoin. Namecoin [27] is the first developed Bitcoin fork that adopted all of
the characteristics of Bitcoin. It also introduced an additional feature allowing users to store data within its
transactions. Various Bitcoin forks have evolved latterly with more features and handled security/privacy
issues. Many of these forks implemented privacy protocols to increase the anonymity of cryptocurrencies.
In Section VII, we discuss notable privacy protocols that have impacted some of these altcoins.
In exceptional occasions, an altcoin can also be the result of a hardfork. A hardfork occurs when
modifications are made to the original software of Bitcoin making its new transactions/blocks incompatible
with those previously generated prior to the modifications. These modifications can be as simple as
altering certain parameters, such as the block size, or as complex as changing major protocols, such
as the consensus algorithm. In order to enforce these modifications, the majority of users/miners must
upgrade their client nodes to the latest version which accommodates these changes. The users/miners
that do not accept the upgrade will view the new transactions/blocks as invalid and will not accept them.
As a result, the blockchain will inevitably split into two paths, one storing transactions of the original
cryptocurrency and one storing transactions generated due to the modifications made, hence creating a
new altcoin. Users in possession of the original cryptocurrency will automatically be granted an equivalent
amount of the new altcoin to what they hold.
Bitcoin Cash is a notable example of a Bitcoin hardfork which occurred on August 1, 2017. It was
the result of enforcing BIP91 [28] which proposed activating Segregated Witness (SegWit) [29]. SegWit
increases the transaction speed of Bitcoin by splitting the transaction into segments and removing the
unlocking signatures which are attached separately at the end. The majority of the miners accepted this
proposal resulting in Bitcoin Cash. Users who possessed BTC were immediately granted an equivalent
amount of BCC (The currency of Bitcoin Cash) to the BTC they possessed.
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While only borrowing the concept of storing transactions in a blockchain, some altcoins have been
implemented from scratch with a completely different design and purpose. These altcoins strive to provide
services and security/privacy countermeasures beyond the capabilities of Bitcoin or any of its forks. They
present substantial differences such as integrating enhanced consensus algorithms or utilizing private
(permissioned) blockchains. In contrast to the public (permissionless) blockchain of Bitcoin, where all
participating nodes are allowed to execute the consensus protocol and maintain the blockchain, a private
blockchain is limited to only specific nodes. As a result, the cryptocurrency market has witnessed a
considerable number of altcoins with substantial innovative features.
I. Major Security and Privacy Issues
Cryptocurrencies are regarded as robust transacting systems designed to avoid payment fraud and
provide superior user privacy. However, major issues in cryptocurrencies have been theorized that can
put security and privacy in jeopardy.
First, the attacker may potentially deceive the system by spending the same coin more than once. This
is known as the double spending attack. Second, cryptocurrencies may be exposed to further weaknesses
through major network and storage vulnerabilities. Third, while cryptocurrencies strive to provide their
users with anonymity, the current solutions could be vulnerable to linkage problems putting the privacy
of the users in jeopardy.
In the following sections, we aim at highlighting major security and privacy issues that exist in Bitcoin
and similar cryptocurrencies today.
IV. DOUBLE-SPENDING ATTACKS
Double-spending is an attack that could be performed by malicious users attempting to deceive the
system by spending the same BTC more than once. The attacker generates duplicates of the same UTXO
and uses it as an input in more than one transaction. Differentiating between the duplicated (fraudulent)
copies and the original becomes an issue when used in a decentralized system. There is no trusted entity
that verifies the legitimacy of the UTXO used as input in a transaction. The inputs of a transaction may
consist of unidentifiable fraudulent BTC that have possibly been spent earlier.
The system defends against such attacks by relying on its users (miners) to validate the legitimacy
of the BTC used as an input to transactions. Using the information stored in the blockchain from the
previous transactions, the miners validate the inputs of any new transaction to ensure that it does not
contain previously spent inputs. Once verified, the transaction is mined into a block which is attached to
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the blockchain. Any user that refers to the blockchain becomes aware that specific UTXO(s) have been
spent earlier, making fraudulent input transactions detectable.
To ensure that attackers cannot manipulate the blockchain in their favor, the mining process is designed
to be an expensive and resource-intensive operation. To mine a block of transactions in the blockchain, the
miners must provide a valid proof-of-work. An attacker that wishes to double-spend BTC must reverse a
transaction that has been stored in the blockchain to reuse its inputs in another transaction. Reversing an
already stored transaction in the blockchain is an extremely difficult task since it requires a significant
share of the total computational power of the system.
In the rest of this section, we will analyze the double-spending attacks. We first discuss conventional
methods to perform double-spending. Next, we analyze the probability and profitability of the double-
spending attack and present a trade-off between the waiting time before accepting a transaction versus
the profitability of the attack.
A. Types of Attacks
A double-spending attack comes in many forms. We discuss various techniques that can be performed.
1) Race Attack: A race attack refers to the case where a merchant accepts an unconfirmed transaction
(a transaction in a transaction pool waiting to be mined and stored in the blockchain) and immediately
provides the payer with a product/service before waiting for confirmation. An attacker with the intention
of deceiving the merchant creates two transactions: (i) a transaction that pays the merchant an amount
of BTC in return for a product/service and (ii) a fraudulent transaction that pays the same amount to
the wallet of the attacker. Both transactions use the same inputs (duplicated BTC) and try to spend the
same BTC. The attacker concurrently releases both transactions into the Bitcoin network. The miners
consider both transactions as being valid until one of them gets stored in the blockchain. The transaction
that gets stored in the blockchain is referred to as a confirmed transaction. At that point, the inputs of
the stored transaction cannot be used as inputs to other transactions. Therefore, the fraudulent transaction
has a chance of being verified first and added to the blockchain making the merchant-paying transaction
invalid. The invalid transaction is rejected by the system and dropped from the transaction pools of
miners.
To avoid a race attack, merchants must wait for the mining to be completed and the transaction to
appear in the blockchain before providing the payer with the product/service. It is recommended that the
merchant should wait for at least six subsequent blocks as confirmation before making the trade. In this
case, the chances for an attacker to reverse a transaction are negligible, assuming that the attacker can
control no more than 10% of the total computational power used in mining.
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
23
2) Finney Attack: Finney attack was first suggested in a Bitcoin forum [30]. Similar to the race attack,
the attacker performing this attack will only succeed if the merchant accepts an unconfirmed transaction.
The attacker creates two transactions similar to those in the race attack and holds on to both of them. The
attacker then begins mining the block containing the fraudulent transaction. If the attacker is successful
in mining the block, the attacker then uses the other transaction to pay a merchant immediately in
exchange for a product/service. Once the merchant makes the trade, the attacker releases the mined block
which contains the fraudulent transaction into the network. Given that the block is already mined, it
will be added to the blockchain immediately. As a result, the merchant-paying transaction will become
invalid. In addition to this, the attacker is rewarded the mining reward for the mined block carrying
the fraudulent transaction. However, the ability to independently mine a block is improbable given the
resources necessary to perform the task.
3) Vector76 Attack: In comparison to the race and Finney attacks, the Vector76 attack requires the
merchant to wait for a single block to be mined and added to the blockchain as a confirmation. To
reverse the transaction, the attacker needs to create a fork in the blockchain. Initially, the attacker
creates a merchant-paying transaction and does not broadcast it to the network. Next, the attacker tries
to independently and secretly mine this transaction into a block. If successful, the attacker holds onto
the block until the honest miners discover another block. The attacker then simultaneously releases the
block into the network at the same time as the honest miners release their block which will result in a
fork. Before the fork is resolved, the attacker creates a fraudulent transaction that double-spends the same
BTC used in the merchant-paying transaction. The attacker then relays the fraudulent transaction to the
honest miners that do not have the path of the blockchain that carries the merchant-paying transaction.
These miners see the fraudulent transaction as valid and begin mining it into a block. As a result, each
path of the blockchain stores one of the transactions. If the path that holds the fraudulent transaction
grows longer than the other path, the double-spending attempt is successful.
4) 51% Attack: 51% attack is the largest threat to the BTC system. This attack is also referred to as
the majority attack in which the attacker (usually a pool of miners) controls more than half of the total
computational power of the system. By controlling the majority of the power, the attacker is capable
of interfering with the process of mining blocks and reversing any block of transactions. During a 51%
attack, the system loses integrity since the other miners no longer have an incentive to compete in the
mining process.
To better comprehend this attack, consider the case where the attacker generates a merchant-paying
transaction and releases it into the network. The merchant waits for an appropriate number of confirma-
tions before accepting the payment and making the trade. Simultaneously, the attacker secretly begins
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to mine a block that contains a fraudulent transaction followed by more blocks to extend it. Since the
computational power of the attacker is more than the rest of the computational power of all the miners
combined, the attacker can mine blocks in less time. Once the merchant accepts the transaction, the
attacker releases the secretly mined blocks to create a fork in the blockchain. If the fraudulent fork
created by the attacker is longer than the original chain, it becomes dominant and all miners begin to
extend on it. By that, the merchant-paying transaction no longer exists in the blockchain.
This attack represents the biggest threat to Bitcoin as it is directly correlated to the resources an attacker
can provide. Resources are measured in terms of financial and computational power. Large entities such
as governments or intelligence agencies have the means to control a large share of the total computational
power. They are able to destroy or push the system into their favorable status. It is important to note that
even with a computational power that is slightly less than 50%, an attacker may still be able to severely
manipulate the system. In the next subsection, we analyze the chances of success of the attackers based
on the share of computational power they control.
B. Probability of Success
Despite the continuous increasing popularity of Bitcoin, the number of merchants that have accepted
it as a method of payment today is still relatively minimal. Many merchants have concerns about its
capabilities in terms of security, while others consider it as a slow method to make payments. Those
that accept it should try to take all precautions before accepting a transaction to prevent double-spending
attacks.
One of the important precautions is to decide when to accept a transaction before making the trade.
Merchants prefer to obtain a certain degree of confidence as assurance that the payer will not be able to
reverse the transaction. Those that can afford to wait a long period of time before accepting a transaction
(for example, online platforms) require a minimum of six confirmations before accepting a transaction
and considering it as being irreversible. However, others that cannot afford this time waiting (such as
vending machines), rush into accepting transactions at the risk of losing the payment to a double-spending
attack.
Similar to the analysis in [1], we model the race between the honest miners and the attacker to
generate blocks as a binomial random walk. The race is denoted as z which represents the number of
blocks generated by the honest miners with computational power p minus the number of blocks generated
by the attacker with computational power q = 1 − p. If a block is generated by the honest miners, we
increment z by 1. Conversely, if a block is generated by the attacker, we decrement z by 1. The race
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between the honest chain and the chain generated by the attacker can be derived as
zi+1 =
zi + 1, with probability p,zi − 1, with probability q, (11)
where i represents an individual block race. If q > p and the attacker has unlimited resources, the attacker
will eventually reach z < 0. At that point, the attacker can replace the blocks generated by the honest
miners and succeed in performing the attack.
The probability of the attackers to catch up and surpass the blocks generated by the honest miners can
be compared to the Gambler’s Ruin Problem. Similar to the description in [31], we assume a gambler
(attacker) begins with an initial fortune i, 0 < i < N , and either wins $1 with probability q or loses
$1 with probability p = 1 − q, in each successive gamble. The game represents a random walk which
terminates at i = 0 (fail) or at i = N (success). The probability of success after i trials is denoted as Pi
and can be calculated as:
Pi = qPi+1 + pPi−1. (12)
Since q + p = 1, we can rewrite equation (12) as:
Pi+1 − Pi = p
q
(Pi − Pi−1) . (13)
At i = 0, the attacker has a probability of success P0 = 0. By rearranging and generalizing equa-
tion (13), we have
Pi+1 = P1
i∑
j=0
(
p
q
)j
=

P1
1−( p
q
)i+1
1−( p
q
) , if p 6= q,
P1(i+ 1), if p = q = 0.5.
(14)
Let i = N − 1 meaning that PN = 1, we can rewrite equation (14) as
1 = PN =

P1
1−( p
q
)N
1−( p
q
) , if p 6= q,
P1N, if p = q = 0.5.
(15)
Solve P1 from equation (15) and substitute the result into equation (14) to obtain
Pi =

1−( p
q
)i
1−( p
q
)N , if p 6= q,
i+1
N , if p = q = 0.5.
(16)
Following the analysis in [32], we assume that the attacker begins with an initial fortune i = y and
can afford to lose up to y dollars before giving up. The gambler wins if i = N = y + z + 1 dollars.
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This assumption modifies the game to account for the probability Ps of the attacker to surpass the blocks
generated by the honest miners as
Pi =

1−( p
q
)y
1−( p
q
)y+z+1 , if p 6= q,
y+1
y+z+1 , if p = q = 0.5.
(17)
Consider an attacker that possesses an unlimited amount of resources and is willing to use as much
of it as needed to perform the attack, i.e. y →∞. If q > p, then
lim
y→∞
1− (pq )y
1− (pq )y+z+1
= 1. (18)
For q < p, we first divide the numerator and denominator by
(
p
q
)y
then calculate the limit as
lim
y→∞
(pq )
−y − 1
(pq )
−y − (pq )z+1
=
(
q
p
)z+1
. (19)
Finally, we can summarize the probability of the attacker to surpass the blocks generated by the honest
miners as
Qz =

(
q
p
)z+1
, if q < p or z ≥ 0,
1, if q > p or z < 0.
(20)
The merchant has no way of figuring out the number of blocks that the attacker has been able to
secretly mine. Therefore, one way to model the overall probability of the attacker to surpass the honest
chain is by using the Poisson distribution. The expected number of blocks an attacker can generate is
λ = (z+1)
(
q
p
)
. The overall probability Ps of the attacker to surpass the honest chain can be computed
by multiplying the Poisson density and the probability of surpassing the honest z − k remaining blocks
as discussed in equation
Ps =
∞∑
k=0
λke−λ
k!
×Qz−k
= 1−
∞∑
k=0
λke−λ
k!
×
1−
(
q
p
)z−k+1
, if q < p or k ≤ z,
1− 1 = 0, if q > p or k > z.
(21)
For equation (21), if q > p, we will always have Ps = 1, meaning that the attacker will win. When
q < p, the probability for the attacker to succeed is
Ps = 1−
z+1∑
k=0
λke−λ
k!
×
(
1−
(
q
p
)z−k+1)
. (22)
Another way to model this probability is by using the negative binomial distribution assuming the
attacker can pre-mine one block before broadcasting the merchant-paying transaction to the network [33].
The merchant waits for n blocks to be generated by the honest miners with computational power p before
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accepting the transaction. At that time, the attacker can secretly generate m blocks with computational
power q = 1 − p, where m = n − z − 1. By definition, we can model this as the m number of blocks
that the attacker can generate (success) before the n number of blocks the honest miners can generate
(failure). Therefore, the probability of a successful double-spending attack for a given value m can be
calculated as
P (m) =
(
m+ n− 1
m
)
× pnqm. (23)
Overall, the probability for an attacker to successfully surpass the number of blocks generated by the
honest miners can be computed as
Ps =
∞∑
m=0
P (m)×Qn−m−1
= 1−
∞∑
m=0
(
m+ n− 1
m
)
× pnqm ×
1−
(
q
p
)n−m
, if q < p or k ≤ n−m,
1− 1 = 0, if q > p or k > n−m.
(24)
Similar to the previous analysis, equation (24) confirms that when q > p, the attacker will always
succeed since Ps = 1. When q < p, the probability of success can be defined as
Ps = 1−
n−1∑
m=0
(
m+ n− 1
k
)
× pnqm ×
(
1−
(
q
p
)n−m)
= 1−
n−1∑
m=0
(
m+ n− 1
m
)
× (pnqm − pmqn). (25)
Fig. 3 shows the results of Ps as n changes based on equation (25). From this figure, the merchant can
obtain the desired level of confidence before accepting a transaction. The obtained level of confidence is
definite for any q at n = 0, meaning that the attackers have 100% chance of success. As the number of
blocks n increases, the chances of a successful double-spending attack decline. Conversely, as q increases,
the chances of a successful attack increase. The figure also shows that if q ≥ 0.5 then we will always get
Ps = 1. This is known as the majority attack. In fact, even if the values of q are slightly less than 0.5,
the chances of a successful double-spending attack could still be high. However, the probability declines
exponentially as the value of n increases.
C. Attack Profitability
A successful double-spending attack is only profitable if the revenue is higher than the cost of
performing the attack. Suppose an attacker tries to double-spend v BTC paid to a merchant in exchange
for a product/service. The attacker releases a transaction into the network that pays v BTC to the wallet
possessed by the merchant. Immediately after releasing the transaction, the attacker secretly begins to
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Fig. 3: Probability of successful double-spending attacks vs. number of confirmations waited by the
merchant.
mine blocks of transactions. One of these blocks contains a fraudulent transaction that pays the same v
BTC to the wallet possessed by the attacker. The merchant accepts the transaction after observing that n
blocks have been extended to the blockchain. If the attacker is able to secretly mine m = n+ 1 blocks
and replace the n blocks in the blockchain generated by the honest miners, then the attacker is successful
in gaining a product/service without paying for it. Assume that the attack returns a value of 2v, one of
which is the actual BTC as a result of reversing the merchant-paying transaction and the other as the
product/service. In addition to this, the attacker gains the mining reward for each block mined and the
transaction fees included in each transaction. Then the revenue gained by the attacker can be formulated
based on his/her corresponding Ps as follows
Revenue ≈ v + Ps(v +Rm) BTC, (26)
where R is the block reward and the transaction fee per block.
Multiple factors can impact the cost such as the price and depreciation value of machinery used, the
cost of electricity, and the amount of BTC being spent in the transaction. However, formulating the cost
with all the possible factors is infeasible. To simplify it, we focus our analysis on the cost factors that
could change significantly as the attack is performed. These factors include the v BTC an attacker spends
in the merchant-paying transaction, the cost of mining m blocks, and the depreciation cost d(t) of the
computing device used in BTC at time t. We derive the cost as follows
Cost ≈ v +meq(t) + d(t) BTC (27)
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where eq(t) is the estimated mining electrical cost in BTC/block of a miner with a share q of the total
computational power of the system. We assume eq(t) remains constant during the total time T the attack
is performed.
We also assume that the average lifespan of the mining equipment is approximately two years. Using
straight-line depreciation, d(t) is a negligible value for an attack over a short period of time. Therefore,
we can reduce the cost equation as follows
Cost ≈ v +meq(t) BTC (28)
The time to mine a single block either by the honest miners or the attackers is approximately ten
minutes. Therefore, we can rewrite equations (25), (26), and (28) as
Ps ≈ 1−
T
10
−1∑
m=0
(
m+ T10 − 1
m
)
× (p T10 qm − pmq T10 ), (29)
Revenue ≈ v + Ps
(
v +
RT
10
)
BTC, (30)
Cost ≈ v +
(
T
10
)
eq(t) BTC. (31)
The profit/loss can be formulated from equations (30) and (31) as
Profit/Loss = Revenue− Cost
≈ Ps
(
v +
RT
10
)
−
(
T
10
)
eq(t) BTC. (32)
Nowadays, to stand a chance in mining Bitcoin, miners merge their computational power into mining
pools as discussed in Section III-G. The mining pools combine the computational power provided by
the computing machine of each participating miner. Machines are categorized into one of four groups:
Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Graphics Pro-
cessing Unit (GPU), and Central Processing Unit (CPU). Each group can provide up to a certain
computational power. Comparisons of most of those machines are presented in [34] and [35].
Each computing machine consumes electricity differently based on its specifications. Even machines
with similar specifications might vary in cost to operate. As a result, formulating the cost of electricity
spent by a miner in the mining process becomes challenging.
ASICs have monopolized the mining process due to their incomparable computational power with
those of the CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs. Miners using any computing machines other than ASICs have a
negligible chance of competing. Many mining pools do not permit miners with these machines to join
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their pools. A miner that joins a mining pool with one of these machines would hardly earn BTC in the
event that the pool successfully mines a block. This is because rewards are usually divided among the
miners based on their contributions as discussed in Section III-G.
Our goal now is to formulate the estimated electrical cost eq(t) of a mining pool. First we estimate
the total number of miners N(t) based on the total hashrate H(t) of the system at a certain time t as
N(t) ≈ H(t)
h(t)
, (33)
where h(t) is the average hashrate of a single mining machine involved in mining at time t.
The cost of electricity is measured in cents/kWh and varies based on the end-use sector and time t.
End-use sectors include, residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation. We denote the average
cost of electricity of all sectors at time t as ea(t). Using the computing wattage w of the machine, the
average running cost c(t) of a machine at time t is
c(t) ≈ ea(t)× w cents/hour. (34)
Using equations (33) and (34), the total cost E(t) for all miners at time t is
E(t) ≈ N(t)× c(t) cents/hour. (35)
We know that it takes approximately 10 minutes to generate one block, i.e. in T = 1 hour, miners can
generate m = 6 blocks. Therefore, the total cost C(t) for all miners to generate one block at T = 10
minutes can be estimated as
C(t) ≈ E(t)
6
cents/10 minutes (1 block). (36)
However, as discussed previously, miners merge their computational power to increase their chances of
winning in the mining competition. The largest mining pool that exists today is Antpool [36] controlling
approximately 25% of the total computational power. Other mining pools also exist such as BTCC
Pool [37], Bixin [38], BTC.com [39], and BTC.TOP [40] that control approximately 7%-11% of the
computational power.
We estimate the average electricity cost eq(t) of a mining pool based on its computational power q as
eq(t) ≈ C(t)× q
≈ H(t)× ea(t)× w × q
6h(t)
cents/block. (37)
For our simulations, we assume that the total cost of mining blocks C(t) by all miners and com-
putational power q of the mining pool are fixed during the total mining time T . We also assume a
mining environment consists of miners using only ASICs such as Antminer S9 since it is one of the
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Fig. 4: Profit/loss of attackers with varying computational power q trying to double-spend v = 5 BTC.
most efficient computing machines on the market today. The specifications of this machine are h = 14
TH/s and w = 1.375 kWh.
Consider an attacker trying to perform a double-spending attack during the period of August 2017.
During that period, 1 BTC was equal to approximately $4500. The total hashrate power was approximately
H = 6, 336, 174 TH/s and the average cost of electricity for all sectors in the U.S. was approximately
10.98 cents/kWh, based on the data collected by the U.S Energy Information Administration [41]. Under
these circumstances, in Fig 4 we present the expected profit/loss of double-spending attacks for various
computational powers q. For this analysis, we assume the attackers try to double-spend v = 5 BTC.
In Fig. 4, a point above y = 0 represents a profit while one below it represents a loss. The point of
intersection of a curve with y = 0 represents the break-even point of an attack. The amount of BTC
spent to perform the attack at this time is equal to the revenue returned. By analyzing the figure, we
attain the following findings:
1) For any value q at t = 0, the attacker turns a profit of exactly v BTC. Recall in Fig. 3, for any value
q at n = 0 (or t = 0), Ps = 1. The merchant accepts an unconfirmed transaction giving the attacker
a theoretically perfect chance to succeed. In this example, the attacker is trying to double-spend v = 5
BTC resulting in a profit = 5 BTC for all values q at t = 0.
2) When the merchant waits for n confirmations before accepting a transaction, the attacker is forced
to mine blocks in order to create a fork in the blockchain and succeed in the attack. As discussed in
Fig. 3, the probability of success is based on the computational power q of the attackers. Larger values
of q correspond to higher probabilities of success Ps, hence larger profits/losses. We also know that Ps
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declines as n (or t) increases for all values q < 0.5. As a result, the profits eventually turn into a loss
as time progresses. An attacker with a smaller value q begins losing at an earlier time during the attack
while one with a larger value q can withstand longer periods before losing. However, as reflected by the
figure, the losses of attackers with smaller values q are less and continue to increase slower than those
with larger values q. This is due to the fact that the cost of electricity eq(t) for attackers with larger
values q are larger than those with smaller values q.
3) In Fig 4, an attacker with q = 0.1 represents the scenario that begins at the maximum possible profit,
then continues to decline till the break-even point. That time is enough for only three blocks to be
added to the blockchain. In other words, three blocks of confirmation for a transaction worth of 5 BTC
should give the merchant enough confidence that an attacker with q = 0.1 will not be able to reverse the
transaction. The attacker will most likely fail to turn a profit if unable to beat the honest miners in the
mining process before they add three blocks to the blockchain. If the attacker continues to perform the
attack beyond this point, the cost will continue to increase while the revenue declines leading to a loss.
As a result, the attacker would most likely surrender at the break-even point to minimize any losses.
4) For q = 0.2 to q = 0.4, Fig 4 shows that the profit continues to grow as t increases until it reaches
a maximum point due to the accumulation of the mining rewards. Once the chance of success Ps starts
to decline with t, the profit also begins to decrease until it reaches the break-even point and later turns
into a loss. However, for q ≥ 0.5, the attacker always succeeds. The profit is represented as a straight
line with a positive slope where the slope represents the rate of turning a profit.
In summary, an attacker with a computational power q < 0.5 will eventually lose at some point as t
increases. On the other hand, an attacker with computational power q ≥ 0.5 will always succeed with a
profit. However, it is important to note that this analysis does not include the luck factor. Consider two
miners with computational powers q1 and q2 respectively, where q1 > q2. The miner with computational
power q1 has more resources to solve the proof-of-work, therefore can perform mining faster than the
miner with computational power q2. However, the miner with computational power q2 could still find
the solution to the proof-of-work first due to the randomness of the exhaustive search performed. From
a probabilistic standpoint, the chances are low.
V. BITCOIN NETWORK SECURITY
Bitcoin is designed to operate over a P2P network. It is vulnerable to the decentralized network attacks
which can escalate other issues. In this section, we will discuss major network attacks that can compromise
Bitcoin and present network related issues. We also suggest possible countermeasures.
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
33
A. Denial of Service Attacks
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks flood the network with bogus traffic in order to disrupt legitimate
services and participating components connected to the Bitcoin network. As an example, DoS attacks on
a mining pool can result in eliminating the pool from the mining competition, hence giving an advantage
to other miners. They could also facilitate double-spending attacks by preventing certain miners from
observing the actual transaction flow [42], [43].
Some nodes prefer to privately connect to the Bitcoin network in order to limit the possibilities of
becoming victims of DoS attacks. However, this limits the nodes to at most 8 outgoing connections. As
the number of private nodes increases in the network, the random topology connection weakens. With
fewer connections between the nodes, information is flooded at slower rates. There is also no guarantee
of the legitimacy of the 8 outgoing connections each private node connects to. This means that even a
private node can still be vulnerable to a DoS attack if it unluckily connects to malicious nodes.
Bitcoin developers are continuously updating the Bitcoin implementation in an effort to minimize the
chances of DoS occurrences. The newer versions analyze the network connections more closely to try
to eliminate suspicious nodes from connecting. Developers also strive to limit certain transactions/blocks
from being flooded throughout the network. New transactions/blocks are given priority over less important
ones such as orphan transactions/blocks. Certain parameters such as block size are also continuously being
altered to adjust the network based on its needs. However, the nature of the P2P network makes Bitcoin
vulnerable to these attacks.
B. Sybil Attacks
Peer-to-peer networks are also vulnerable to Sybil attacks [23]. In Sybil attacks, the attacker sets up
multiple pseudonymous identities from a single node. In this way, the attacker can acquire an unfair
number of shares of the network IP addresses. The honest nodes in the network can easily be deceived
into believing that the IP addresses belong to different nodes. With a large number of IP addresses, the
attacker can monopolize other connections of nodes and control data propagating to them.
A countermeasure to this attack was proposed in the original Bitcoin white paper [1]. This counter-
measure also presented a solution to the majority decision-making problem. It is more convenient to
have a one-to-one relationship between a computing machine (node) and a vote instead of having one
between an IP address and a vote. An attacker reproducing multiple IP addresses from a single node
can no longer make use of them. Every node must engage in a proof-of-work procedure to prove its
legitimacy as discussed in Section III-F.
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Other countermeasures have been taken by the Bitcoin developers to limit Sybil attacks. Each outbound
connection is limited to a single IP address per subnet mask 255.255.0.0 (i.e. x.y.0.0/16). In other words,
a malicious node can theoretically generate 65536 IP addresses per network prefix consisting of 16
bits where only one can be utilized in a requested outbound connection. Today, owning a machine
with different network prefixes that consist of 16 bits which can generate numerous IP addresses is
impracticable. Malicious users with IP addresses belonging to different network prefixes need to collude
in order to pull off such an attack.
Developers can continue to increase the security by limiting outbound connections to larger subnet
masks (for example x.y.z.0/24), however, this would limit the connection possibilities to the outbound
connections which contradicts the P2P network. To optimize security, the subnet mask should be modified
dynamically based on the available network prefixes of the nodes connected to the network. This
optimization is very challenging since there is no fixed pattern to how or when nodes connect to the
network. In general, this practice is a weak security countermeasure and can slightly increase the security
if optimized.
Users should also realize that the majority of node connections are inbound connections (117). If we
were to assume that all the 8 outbound connections of a node are legitimate, there is no guarantee that
the inbound connections are genuine. A private node relies only on its outbound connections to limit its
network connections and the data it receives.
C. Eclipse Attacks
The Eclipse attack on Bitcoin was proposed in [44]. The primary purpose of an eclipse attack as
defined originally in [45]–[47] is to monopolize all the outbound and inbound connections of a node
within a P2P network. As a result, the victim node becomes isolated from the rest of the network and
only receives data fed to it by the attacker. By monopolizing the connections of a node, the attacker can
control the blockchain view of this node. The eclipse attack targets nodes that are possibly discoverable;
nodes with public IP addresses. It strives to populate the tried and new tables of nodes with bogus IP
addresses by frequently sending the victim nodes unsolicited addr messages. When the tables of nodes
are full, they begin evicting random IP addresses to replace them with the newer ones.
The attack requires the victim node to restart all of its connections. Examples that may cause connection
restarts include Internet Service Provider outages, power failures or system/software updates. When the
node tries reconnecting to its 8 permitted outbound connections, it will choose the compromised addresses
in either the new or tried tables with a bias towards the newest stored IP addresses. The optimum time to
perform the attack is after populating the tables of the victim node with a decent number of controlled IP
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addresses. The chances of a successful attack are based on the percentage of the controlled IP addresses
and the time an attacker spends performing the attack.
To limit an eclipse attack, some countermeasures have been proposed [44]. When replacing IP addresses
as newer ones arrive, a deterministic eviction method could be used instead of the random eviction
technique. In this way, each IP address is mapped to exactly one slot in the tables rather than multiple
slots, requiring the attacker to possess a large number of addresses. Also, allowing random selection of
IP addresses rather than choosing the most recent ones when initiating an outbound connection makes
the attack less biased to the bogus addresses of the attacker. Other measures include checking an evicted
IP address before replacing it with a new one. If the address still connects successfully, there is no reason
to evict and replace it with another one. Feeler and anchor connections are also good methods that can
disrupt an attacker. Other measures such as increasing the size of the tables, allowing more outgoing
connections, or banning unsolicited addr can also greatly limit eclipse attacks.
D. Routing Attacks
The main purpose of a routing attack is to intercept the network transmitted messages and tamper with
them. The work presented in [48] proposed a routing attack on Bitcoin via the Internet infrastructure. The
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [49] is the most widely used protocol when transmitting data between
Autonomous Systems (ASs). An AS manages a set of nodes with similar IP address prefixes and is
responsible for routing data between its nodes and other ASs.
The proposed attack intercepts traffic between ASs by performing two independent attacks: partitioning
attack and delay attack. The attack takes advantage of the fact that ASs do not validate the newly
announced BGP routes which could result in possible BGP hijacks. A malicious AS can announce
forged IP address prefixes to deceive other ASs into believing false routing information. As a result, a
successful attacker will be able to intercept all the traffic for nodes with a certain IP address prefix before
it reaches its original destination.
The partitioning attack strives to partition the Bitcoin network into two disjoint groups. One group
represents the set of isolated nodes while the other group represents the remaining network. The attacker,
usually an AS, requires BGP hijacking of other ASs. Once hijacked, the attacker can intercept all inbound
and outbound traffic of all the victim ASs. However, the attacker cannot intercept the traffic of stealth
connections. Such connections include intra-AS, node connections within the same AS, intra-pool, node
connections between gateways belonging to the same mining pool or pool-to-pool, private connections
established between pools. Stealth connections can leak data to the isolated group of nodes and result
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in an attack failure. Therefore, the attacker must detect such nodes and remove them from the lists of
nodes to be isolated.
Once the network is divided into two groups, the attacker can perform the delay attack. The main goal
of the delay attack is to tamper with data propagating to its destination and cause a stall. The success of
the attack relies on the fact that message exchanging (inv, getdata, and tx) is not encrypted. If the attacker
intercepts the flow of traffic between ASs, it is possible to tamper with these messages without any node
learning about it. For example, when a node within an AS requests data from its peer within another
AS, the attacker will intercept the requested message (getdata) and modify the request. As a result, the
sending node will send undesired data and cause the receiving node to resend a request message. As
long as the attack occurs in a 20-minute time frame, the nodes will not lose their connection and will
not be aware that their messages are being tampered with.
The authors in [48] suggest some countermeasures to limit the routing attacks. Simple measures include
increasing and diversifying AS connections. Also, monitoring the network information such as round-trip
time can help identify potential threats. More complex measures can include, encrypting messages, using
different channels and ports, and simultaneously requesting data from more than one peer. However,
implementing such more complex measures could introduce additional cost and delay.
VI. BITCOIN STORAGE SECURITY
Unlike physical wallets that are used to hold cash and banking cards, Bitcoin wallets behave differently.
A bitcoin wallet does not store actual BTC. Instead, it stores the private and public key pairs that can be
utilized to prove the ownership rights to certain BTC stored over the blockchain. As discussed in Section
III-B, keys are generated using pseudo-random number generators and elliptic curve cryptography. In this
section, we discuss the variations in Bitcoin wallets and outline the security issues in each.
Similar to [50], we first discuss Bitcoin wallet security based on the key generation and infrastructure
of the wallet. Three types of wallets have been defined in BTC. We summarize the comparison between
all three types in Table I.
The simpler wallets are categorized as nondeterministic wallets, sometimes referred to as Type-0 wallets.
In these wallets, when a new pair of keys is requested, the wallet generates a random private key as shown
in equation (1). Next, the wallet derives its corresponding public key as described in equation (2). The
generated key pair is completely random and uncorrelated to the previously generated keys. However,
these wallets require sophisticated management and could fail to perform well as the number of stored
keys grows exceeding the storage capacity of the wallet. A consistent backup of the generated keys is
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Fig. 5: The structure of a hierarchical deterministic wallet.
also essential to ensure that the users can still access their BTC in the event of a wallet being unavailable.
However, backups are liable to theft and can result in exposing all the keys belonging to a wallet.
Deterministic wallets are another type of BTC wallets. They are also referred to as Type-1 wallets and
can handle the drawbacks of type-0 wallets. In this type of wallet, all the generated keys are based on a
common and randomly chosen seed s. Using the s, all the keys are derived in a deterministic manner.
First, a private key with an index i is generated as
Pri = SHA256(s||i). (38)
Using equation (38), the corresponding public key Pubi is then generated as discussed in equation (2). In
contrast to nondeterministic wallets, deterministic wallets need only to keep a backup of s to regenerate
all of the previously derived keys.
Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) wallets, referred to as Type-2 wallets, were later introduced based on
the BIP0032 standard [51]. In HD wallets, keys are generated in a tree structure as shown in Fig. 5. The
key of a node is generated using its corresponding parent node key.
For each node, a key consists of three components: a private key Pr, a public key Pub and a chain
code (CC). The chain code is a third component introduced to prevent the derivation of the key of a
child node from only the private and public keys of the parent node. In this way, the extended key is an
extension of both the private and public key. The extended private key is a combination of the private
key and chain code which is used to derive the private key of a child node. Using the derived private
key of the child node, it is possible to derive its corresponding public key as explained in equation (2).
On the other hand, the extended public key is a combination of the public key and chain code which is
used to derive the public key of a child node. It is important to realize that the public key of a child
node can be derived using either the extended private or extended public keys.
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
38
Key generation begins at depth 0 which derives the root node (master) key components using a randomly
chosen seed (s). In many wallets, s is in the form of a mnemonic word sequence as described in BIP0039
standard [52]. A mnemonic word sequence is a sequence of English words that represents a random
number used to derive s. Using s, the master private key PrM and chain code CCM are derived as
PrM = Left256(HMAC-SHA512(s)), (39)
CCM = Right256(HMAC-SHA512(s)), (40)
where HMAC-SHA512 is a one-way hash-based message authentication code that outputs a 512 bit digest
and functions Left256 and Right256 extract the left and right 256 bits of the digest respectively. Using
the result in equation (39), the master public key PubM is generated as described in equation (2).
TABLE I: Wallet Infrastructure Comparison.
Infrastructure Management Seed Backup Structure
Type 0 Complex No All keys Random
Type 1 Moderate Yes Only the seed Sequential
Type 2 Simple Yes Only the seed Hierarchical
The next step is to generate keys for the children nodes at depth 1 in the tree. Keys can be generated
differently depending on the security of the environment in which the wallet is being used. For example,
when used in a secure environment, the wallet uses the extended private key to generate all the components
of a child node key. This includes the private key which would allow the user to spend BTC from the
wallet. Using the private key Prp of the parent, we can generate the corresponding public key Pubp and
derive both the private key Prc and chain code CCc of the child using a Child Key Derivation (CKD)
function as
Prc=Left256(HMAC-SHA512(Pubp||CCp||i)) + Prp, (41)
CCc=Right256(HMAC-SHA512(Pubp||CCp||i)), (42)
where Pubp = PubM , Prp = PrM , CCp = CCM are the public key, private key, and chain code of the
parent node respectively and i is the index of the child node. Using the result of equation (41), we can
derive the public key Pubc of the child node as explained in equation (2).
On the other hand, when used in an insecure environment, the wallet uses the extended public key to
derive only the public key and chain code of the child node instead of the private key. This protects the
private key from being exposed to potential attackers. It also allows payments to be made to the wallet
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while preventing them from being spent. The public key Pubc and chain code CCc of the child node are
derived using the CKD function as
Pubc=Left256(HMAC-SHA512(Pubp||CCp||i))+Pubp, (43)
CCc=Right256(HMAC-SHA512(Pubp||CCp||i)). (44)
Although using the extended public key is more secure as it does not expose the private key, it may still
put the wallet at risk. The extended public key exposes the chain code which is an essential component
in key derivation. Using an exposed chain code and public key, an attacker can perform a brute-force
attack on all the chain codes derived from it as shown in equation (44). In other cases, if the private key
of a node is compromised in any way, the attacker can use it along with its corresponding exposed chain
code to derive the extended private keys of all the descending children nodes as shown in equations (41)
and (42). We also consider the worst case scenario where an attacker is capable of reversing a derived
Prc as shown in equation (41). If successful, using the corresponding parent extended public key, an
attacker can derive Prp.
To counter these issues, HD wallets also implement an enhanced derivation function known as the
hardened CKD. This derivation strives to secure the exposed chain code within an extended public key.
It prevents the public key of a child node from being derived from the extended public key. Therefore,
the extended private key of the parent node is only useful to derive a hardened private key Prch and chain
code CCch of the child node as
Prch = Left256(HMAC-SHA512(Pr
p||CCp||i)) + Prp, (45)
CCch = Right256(HMAC-SHA512(Pr
p||CCp||i)). (46)
Using the result in equation (45), the corresponding hardened public key Pubch of the child node can be
derived as explained in equation (2). In practice, it is suggested to derive the children keys of the master
node using the hardened CKD to keep the master key as secure as possible.
Bitcoin wallets can also take other measures to increase the security of storing keys. Practices such as
P2SH [53] and Multi-Sig transactions increase the security of the BTC stored in the wallet, as discussed
in Section III-C. Such techniques are referred to as threshold techniques as they require M -of-N private
keys to enable BTC spending. Other wallets enhance the security by encrypting the stored private keys
along with a pass-phrase chosen by the owner of the wallet as defined in BIP0038 standard [54]. That is
Encrypt(Pr) = AESk(Pr||PassPhrase), (47)
where AES is the Advanced Encryption Standard [55] and k is the encryption key. If a user wishes to
spend BTC, the user must first decrypt the corresponding encrypted private key using k and the pass-
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phrase previously used in encryption. Although encryption provides higher levels of security, the user
must keep the pass-phrase and encryption keys stored securely.
TABLE II: Wallet Function Comparison.
Type Function Examples
Full Service (on-
line)
Generate private key, derive
public key, distribute public
key, monitor output TX, cre-
ate/sign unsigned TX, broadcast
TX
coinbase.com [56],
blockchain.info
[57]
Signing-only
(offline)
Generate parent private key, de-
rive parent public key, sign TX
Ledger Nano [58],
TREZOR [59]
Distributed
(offline)
Derive CKD, Distribute public
key
customized pre-
populated database
The wallets that exist today come in different forms and account for different security measures. Based
on the different installation environments, wallets can be categorized into three types: online (web) wallets,
desktop (software) wallets, and mobile wallets. As in [60], we can further categorize each type of these
wallets into: full-service wallets, signing-only wallets and distributing wallets, based on the functions that
they can perform. Table II summarizes these different functions.
A full-service wallet is one that can perform all the functions required to spend and receive BTC. These
functions include generating private keys needed to spend BTC, signing transactions with the private keys,
deriving public keys needed to receive payments of BTC, broadcasting the derived public keys to the
network, and monitoring the BTC spending and receiving of a wallet. Full-service wallets must be able
to connect to the Bitcoin network. Examples of online full-service wallets include the wallets provided
by coinbase.com [56] and blockchain.info [57]. Armory, Electrum and Bitcoin Core are the most popular
desktop full-service wallets today. For mobile wallets, an example that runs on both Android and iOS
includes the Airbitz wallet.
The second type of wallets are the signing-only wallets. The main purpose behind these wallets is to
enhance the security of the wallet by generating private keys in secure offline environments. Working in
conjunction with a networked wallet, the signing-only wallet can interact with the Bitcoin network and
can deterministically generate pairs of private and public keys as needed to transfer the public key to
the networked wallet. The role of the networked wallet is to distribute the public key to allow payments
to be made to the wallet. In case of an HD wallet, the network can also generate child node keys as
desired. Once the networked wallet detects a transaction addressed to one of the public keys that it has
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distributed, it creates an unsigned transaction based on the UTXO and transfers it to the signing-only
wallet. The signing-only wallet then uses its private key that could be derived from an extended private
key in the case of an HD wallet to sign the transaction and returns it back to the networked wallet.
Finally, the networked wallet distributes the signed transaction in the Bitcoin network to claim the BTC.
Signing wallets can either be offline wallets or hardware wallets. Offline wallets are designed to reduce
the network vulnerabilities. Their tasks include private key derivation and transaction signing. The signed
transactions are transferred via removable media to the online wallets. Offline wallets provide higher
levels of security than the full-service wallets, however, they require a continuously isolated device. On
the other hand, hardware wallets are less of a hassle than offline wallets. They are connected directly to the
networked device which eliminates the dependency of removable media when communicating between
the signing-only wallet and the networked model. However, the hardware wallet is also inconvenient in
situations where the owner makes frequent payments since the owner must constantly carry the hardware
wallet to be able to make a payment anytime. As a result, many people use hardware wallets for long-term
storage rather than day-to-day transactions. Utilizing this type of wallet, one can store large amounts of
BTC in the most secure environments. Popular examples of hardware wallets today include the Ledger [58]
Nano and TREZOR [59].
The final type of wallets are the distributing-only wallets. These wallets also strive to reduce the
security issues caused by the full-service wallets. They are in the form of networked wallets for public
key distribution in a pre-populated manner, where the public keys are derived and distributed as needed
by the network. Other distributing-only wallets are capable of generating the public keys as the case in
HD wallets.
Exchange platforms store large portions of cryptocoins in online wallets to provide their users the
advantage of reduced transaction time due to the immediate availability of their private keys. This is
analogous to storing cash in a centralized entity such as a bank. It is important to point out that storing
cryptocoins in an online wallet provided by an exchange platform is the least secure method since it means
storing the corresponding private keys that can spend those cryptocoins. The users must completely trust
the exchange platform to safely store the private keys and not act maliciously. Even worse, assuming
we can trust an exchange platform, cryptocoin owners are still at risk of losing their cryptocoins in the
event the exchange platform online wallets are hacked and the private keys are leaked. A hacker that
gets a hold of the private keys can immediately use them to send the cryptocoins to his/her personal
address. Once the transaction is processed and stored over the blockchain, it becomes immutable to being
deleted/modified and most likely will not be reversed unless the blockchain is hard forked.
Throughout the history of cryptocurrencies, multiple attacks have occurred to exchanges that resulted
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in massive losses and severe price panics to certain cryptocurrencies. In 2011, one of the most notable
Japanese-based exchanges, Mt. Gox, online wallets were hacked, leaking all the private keys it stored
in the wallet.dat file. Mt. Gox was able to recover from that heist, however, later in 2014, it filed for
bankruptcy and was shut down since it was responsible for around 70% of Bitcoin trading volume and
lost approximately 850,000 BTC that was valued at more than $450 million dollars. The hackers were
able to even steal BTC stored in the exchange’s hardware wallets. There is no legitimate evidence of
how the attack occurred. In March 2014, Mt. Gox reported on its website that it had found 200,000 BTC
from the total stolen in old-format digital wallets. The other 650,000 were believed to be laundered on
another exchange platform known as BTC-e.
The problem is that such heists could possibly occur again. Exchange platforms remain to be an
extremely attractive hacking points for hackers since they hold so many funds in the least secure manner.
Users are recommended to keep limited amounts stored in exchanges while storing the majority of their
funds in hardware wallets.
Another issue is whether or not it is possible to track the movement of stolen cryptocoins, hence,
catch the hacker. Based on our analysis, it is theoretically possible. However, there have been scenarios
where hackers were able to launder large portions of stolen cryptocoins such as the example discussed
previously. Another famous example occurred in January 2018 when about $534 million dollars worth of
a cryptocoin known as XEM were stolen from a Japanese-based exchange known as Coincheck. Today,
this heist represents the largest theft in the history of cryptocurrencies. The exchange also announced
that the cryptocoins were stolen from its online wallets through multiple unauthorized transactions. In an
effort to combat this fiasco, the developer team announced that they will develop an automated tagging
system to tag stolen XEM cryptocoins. However, the tracking system was ineffective. Once more, the
stolen cryptocoins were laundered and completely lost.
In conclusion, we stress on the fact that there remains to be a trade-off between the security of a
wallet and the ease of use. The most frequently used wallets today are full-service wallets. They are free,
user-friendly and can perform all functions needed by a BTC owner. However, these wallets could be
vulnerable to theft since they are connected to the network.
VII. BITCOIN PRIVACY
Bitcoin suffers inherent privacy issues in that attackers could link certain identities to their pseudonyms
(such as Bitcoin addresses) and identify their history of transactions. This is known as the linking problem.
Many users publish their real identities and Bitcoin addresses online so that others can make payments
to them. This practice is common among blogs and websites that request BTC as donations or those
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selling a product or service. These actions could jeopardize their anonymity. Another common example
is when users trade BTC for other altcoins over exchange platforms. Most exchange platforms require
users to validate their identities by uploading a copy of official identification which exposes the users to
the exchange applications. Such examples do not require an attack to learn the full transaction history
of those users. Simply by tracing the Bitcoin addresses over the blockchain, the transactions could be
revealed. In fact, even cautious users that do not publicly use their identities may be at risk as well.
Bitcoin utilizes Bitcoin addresses as its defense mechanisms to preserve the privacy of users. When
generated for the users, bitcoin addresses do not leak any information about the identities of the users.
However, attackers strive to search for links between bitcoin addresses and user identities using auxiliary
information available over the network. If a link is found, it is possible to discover all the other Bitcoin
addresses belonging to that user and revealing the complete history of BTC transactions of the user.
Today, powerful analysis tools and search engines can be utilized to discover the Bitcoin address and
determine this information. Even the strongly encouraged practice of using a new Bitcoin address for
every new transaction cannot completely prevent this information from being revealed once a Bitcoin
address is linked to an identity of the user.
The auxiliary information can be obtained by multiple methods. Different techniques exist today that
can speculate links between Bitcoin addresses and user identities. The study in [61] shows that using
information about how nodes are connected within a network can help identify users. In [62], it was shown
that patterns of co-occurrences may reveal useful information and lead to any ties. The study in [63]
showed that just by monitoring the communication channel, users are likely to lose their anonymity.
In [64], an analysis is presented that shows how compromised network nodes can leak significant user
information and link them to certain transactions. For further reading, we direct reader to [65]–[68] that
present similar studies.
Users can run their nodes over Tor [69] in an effort to hide their information from the rest of the network.
Tor is a software that provides an additional layer of anonymity. It utilizes multi-layer encryption and
random relaying nodes to transfer data between a sender and receiver. The sender begins by sending
the multi-layer encrypted message to a random node that decrypts a single layer and transmits it to the
next relaying node. This process continues until the message is completely decrypted and arrives at the
receiver [70]. However, multiple studies, such as [71]–[74], have shown that even a low-resource attacker
could be capable of gaining information flowing between users running their Bitcoin nodes over Tor.
This information can include the data sent between nodes or even the location of the nodes within the
network topology.
Other efforts have also been employed in an effort to improve the anonymity of Bitcoin. We classify
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these efforts into two main classes: mixing services and joint transaction.
A. Bitcoin Mixing Services
BTC mixing is an approach that mixes identifiable BTC in an effort to make them unrecognizable by
public observers. The first generation mixing was centralized and performed by tumblers. Tumblers are
third party mixers that receive BTC from different users, randomly mix them up, and then return to the
users their updated BTC amounts. An attacker would no longer be able to trace the BTC of a certain
user since the user no longer possesses the same BTC that he/she previously owned. However, a tumbler
being a centralized entity presents many threats to the users. It must be fully trusted not to steal the BTC
it mixes or even leak any information about the mixing process. Even when completely trusted, being
centralized makes it prone to being compromised. In addition to this, tumblers charge users mixing fees
in return for their services.
In an effort to mitigate these risks, a new generation of peer-to-peer tumblers was introduced to
decentralize the process. Instead of sending BTC to a tumbler that performs mixing, the users themselves
are involved in the process. This eliminates the need to completely trust a third party and minimizes the
risk of privacy leakage. An example of such a protocol is CoinSwap which is presented in [75].
B. Bitcoin Joint Transactions
A joint transaction allows different users to combine the inputs and outputs of their transactions into a
single transaction to be processed as a whole. All participating users must provide their own signatures
to the transaction to unlock their input portion. Once all participating users correctly sign their inputs,
the transaction can be processed as a regular transaction and added to the blockchain. An attacker can
no longer trace the BTC movement of a user since there is no direct relationship between the inputs
and the outputs of a transaction. The level of privacy provided by a joint transaction increases with the
number of participating users. This also results in a lower transaction fee that is paid by each user as it
is divided among more users. In 2013, Gregory Maxwell introduced this concept as CoinJoin [76] which
is widely used in practice today. CoinJoin eventually began to evolve and existed in multiple flavors.
Notable examples that introduced new concepts are described below.
SharedCoin: SharedCoin provided by Blockchain.info is one of the initial implementations of the Coin-
Join protocol that ran over a centralized server. The centralized server was the meeting room for the
participating users to meet and combine their transactions together. Since users meet in one place, the
server is capable of keeping logs of the transactions processed over it. This requires users to completely
trust the server not to misuse these logs and put their information at risk if compromised. Shortly, Kristov
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Atlas created CoinJoin Sudoku, a software that is capable of analyzing the mixing process performed by
SharedCoin. The software aims at discovering the relationships between transactions and their owners. It
clustered matching inputs and outputs of transactions trying to identify a common owner. However, this
implementation is completely suspended today due to its various privacy limitations.
Dark Wallet: In 2013, Cody Willson and Amir Taaki introduced Dark Wallet [77]. It provides anonymity
using stealth addresses and the CoinJoin protocol. A stealth address is a public seed address combined
with some metadata used to derive an actual address for a payee to receive transactions. The metadata
is shared only between the payer and the payee, and cannot be accessed by the public observers. To
generate an actual address, the payee generates a private key and its corresponding public key. Next, the
payer uses the public key of the payee and some metadata to generate a transaction with a new address.
Once the payee learns the metadata, it can claim the amount attached to the transaction by deriving the
appropriate key from the stealth address. Others trying to trace the transaction that was received with a
stealth address would not be able to trace it. However, Dark Wallet cannot provide complete anonymity
against linking users to certain BTC transactions since the payer can trace it.
CoinShuffle: CoinShuffle was introduced in 2014 [78]. It is a combination of the CoinJoin protocol and the
accountable anonymous group communication protocol Dissent [79]. Its main purpose is to eliminate the
involvement of third parties while achieving anonymity and protection against DoS attacks. The protocol
consists of three main phases: announcement, shuffling and transaction verification. In the announcement
phase, the participants generate a new pair of private and public keys then broadcast their corresponding
public key to the other participants. In the shuffling phase, each participant generates a new Bitcoin address
to be used as their output address in the mixing transaction. Following that, the participants obliviously
shuffle these generated Bitcoin addresses. In the transaction verification phase, every participant checks
whether their Bitcoin address is contained in the output list. If present, each participant creates a mixing
transaction that spends the inputs to the shuffled list of outputs, signs the transaction, and broadcasts the
signature. Once each participant receives the signatures of the others, every participant can generate a
fully signed version of the mixing transaction. Dishonest behavior can be detected by the presence of
one honest participant who would not broadcast his/her signature and report the dishonesty to all other
participants.
However, Coinshuffle suffers anonymity vulnerability if not used cautiously since it allows users to
assign change back to themselves in the mixing transaction. Once the change is assigned to the Bitcoin
address of the user, anonymity could easily be lost. The best solution to this problem is to use amounts
that do not require any change. However, the user does not necessarily get to choose what amount to
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use since the user must use UTXO(s) from previous transactions. In addition to this, Coinshuffle reveals
the identities of the participants among each other during the process.
JoinMarket: JoinMarket [80] is a decentralized CoinJoin implementation. It aimed at improving the
privacy of all the previous implementations. JoinMarket introduced two types of participating users,
market makers, and market takers. Market makers are users who are willing to mix their BTC at any given
time in return for a fee. On the other hand, market takers are users that demand immediate mixing service
and are willing to pay a fee as compensation to the market makers. Market makers and takers negotiate
the service over an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel. Once terms are discussed, a mixing contract is
generated which enables each participating user to operate from their own personal machine. The fact
that the system is decentralized protects users from the need to trust a centralized entity. Furthermore,
the fee paid by the takers to the makers incentivizes them to continue to join.
Various protocols continue to evolve in an effort to increase the anonymity of Bitcoin. However, the
linkage problem still remains within Bitcoin that could jeopardize the anonymity of its users.
VIII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF ALTCOINS
The continuous emergence of altcoins presents enhanced features to the cryptocurrency enthusiasts.
Some of these altcoins have proven to provide enhanced security and privacy over Bitcoin. However,
Bitcoin continues to remain at the top of the list of cryptocurrencies with the largest market cap. This
contradiction raises questions around its continuous dominance.
In this section, we unfold the major security and privacy advantages of altcoins. We first investigate
distinct consensus algorithms implemented by different altcoins in an effort to keep their network secure.
We strive to elucidate the security advantages of these algorithms over the proof-of-work implemented
by Bitcoin. Next, we discuss major altcoin privacy protocols and privacy improvement over Bitcoin.
A. Altcoin Security
The Proof-of-Work (PoW) implemented in Bitcoin utilizes SHA256; a CPU-bound function. The time
needed to run SHA256 is determined by the speed of the machine. Powerful machines such as ASICs
can run SHA256 millions of times faster than various other CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs. This created an
unfair mining competition since not all miners use the same computing machine. In fact, it eliminated
miners using CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs since their chances of success are negligible when compared to
those using ASICs.
This PoW has also been greatly criticized for being an energy-wasting technique. Mining is performed
using powerful computing machines that require substantial energy to run. Most of the energy used by all
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
47
these miners ends up being wasted since the output of only one miner is used to extend the blockchain.
As a result, the cost of running this PoW to achieve consensus is extremely costly.
In addition to this, it is expected that Bitcoin will suffer a mining tragedy of the commons [81]. The
mining reward will converge to zero since it continues to halve approximately every four years (precisely
every 210,000 blocks). Eventually, the miners will no longer have an incentive in taking part of the
consensus procedure someday. This will force the transacting users to increase their transaction fees as
an alternative incentive to the miners. As a result, both the users and miners will be driven away from
the system.
In an effort to mitigate these issues, some altcoins replaced SHA256 with memory-bound hash functions
in their PoW. In comparison to the CPU-bound function used by Bitcoin, the time needed to run memory-
bound functions is determined by the amount of memory available to hold the processed data. Developing
ASICs for memory-bound functions is no longer advantageous since they can only optimize CPU-bound
functions. Notable examples of such functions include scrypt [82] and CryptoNight [83] Combinations
of hashing algorithms have even been used such as X11 [84] and X12-X17 [85]. In these algorithms,
11-17 different hashing algorithms used. The result of each sub-algorithm is fed as input to the next
sub-algorithm. Popular altcoins such as Litecoin, DASH [86], and Monero implement such examples.
However, it was not too long until optimized memory-bound ASICs started re-monopolizing the mining
process once again.
Developing an ASIC-resistant PoW has not succeeded. Altcoin developers began to deviate their efforts
to implement alternative consensus algorithms that strive to mitigate ASIC centralization and prevent
critical issues such as double-spending attacks. Similar to PoW, many of these alternative consensus
protocols are chain-based. A chain-based protocol pseudo-randomly selects a single validator to generate
the next block of the blockchain. Some widely implemented consensus chain-based protocols are described
below.
Proof-of-Stake (PoS): PoS is an alternative consensus algorithm that was initially suggested in [87].
In contrast to PoW, PoS is dependent on economic stakes of users (i.e. holdings in cryptocurrency)
rather than their computational resources. The algorithm deterministically selects a user with significant
holdings to validate the next block. In return, the selected validator is rewarded a certain value of the
cryptocurrency similar to the mining reward in PoW and all the transaction fees included in the block.
Conceptually, a user holding x% of the total available cryptocurrency will be chosen x% of the time as
the validator in generating the next block. Once the block is generated, the validator relays it to the other
validators to confirm it and extend the blockchain.
PoS has multiple benefits in comparison to PoW. Users are no longer required to consume substantial
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quantities of electricity since they no longer engage in a mining process. In fact, they are motivated to
take part in the validation process as it requires nothing more than presenting their wealth in return for a
reward if chosen to be the validator. In contrast to PoW, PoS significantly speeds up the consensus process.
From a security perspective, PoS tackles the 51% attack by making it more expensive than performing
it in a PoW environment. An attacker would need to possess 51% of the total cryptocurrency available
to perform the majority attack. Assuming a single user possesses 51% of the total cryptocurrency and
performs the attack, the value of the cryptocurrency will drop and the attacker would suffer most being
the majority stakeholder. In comparison to PoW, the majority attack requires 51% of the total mining
power which is theoretically achievable through mining pools. This incident previously occurred in the
mining environment of Bitcoin as a mining pool (Ghash.IO) exceeded the 51% threshold.
Although PoS could handle some issues caused by PoW, it also introduced some major challenges. The
largest stakeholders will be able to monopolize the consensus procedure as they will always be selected
and earn the reward. This will create a centralized consensus environment. In addition to this, an attacker
with a 51% stake can also completely destroy the cryptocurrency, assuming the intentions of the attacker
are to eradicate the system at any price. PoS also suffers a major flaw known as Nothing at Stake (NoS).
This issue can occur if coincidentally two stakeholders are chosen to validate the next block. This may
result in two valid blocks that can extend the blockchain. As a result, a fork may occur to the blockchain
as the miners accept both blocks. To resolve the fork, the validators vote on both branches. Voting is
done at no cost which may be an incentive for a malicious validator to vote for a specific path of the
blockchain and facilitate a double-spending attack.
These issues resulted in PoS to start appearing in multiple flavors. Its first implementation appeared
in a Bitcoin fork, namely Peercoin, which incorporates a hybrid of an energy-efficient PoS [88] and the
original PoW that runs SHA256. PoW was used initially as a method of coin generation and distribution
to get the system running. As time progressed, PoW was slowly replaced by PoS to validate transactions,
mint new coins and maintain consensus. The validators are chosen based on the number of coins in their
possession and their corresponding age (i.e. a timestamp indicating how old the coins are). Once they
are granted a reward in return for their service, the age of their coins goes back to zero to give other
validators a chance to generate the next block. By that, no single validator can monopolize the validation
process.
Later, modified versions of PoS were implemented into some cryptocurrencies. In [89], the age of the
coins was removed as it was argued to be abusive to the system. It can help gain significant network
weight and facilitate a double-spending attack. In some cases, it may also discourage honest users from
staking persistently as they would hold back until their coins are oldest in age to maximize their chances.
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In [90], a delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) was proposed where the users vote for validators (referred
to as witnesses). Each vote has a different strength based on the stake of the user. However, this requires
users to completely trust the validators they vote for.
Proof-of-Activity (PoA): PoA is a consensus algorithm that combines PoW and PoS into one protocol [91].
Its purpose is to reward only the online participators, thus motivate more miners to remain online in an
effort to secure the network. The protocol is analogous to the lottery where the chances of winning of
an individual are based on the number of tickets the individual holds.
In PoA, miners first utilize their computational power to compete in generating an empty block header;
one that does not reference any transactions. A successful miner then immediately broadcasts the resulting
hash to the network. This hash value is used to deterministically derive N pseudo-random stakeholders
who are potential miners if found to be online. The derivation of these N stakeholders is performed by
hashing a concatenation of the broadcast hash value, the hash of the previous block, and N fixed suffix
values. The protocol then invokes a subroutine known as follow-the-satoshi once for each derived value.
The subroutine finds the block storing a satoshi with the same index as the result. Next, it inspects the
block in which the satoshi was minted and traces its movement up until its last owner. If online, this
owner participates in the next block generation process that extends the blockchain. Similar to PoS, the
more satoshis an individual owns, the more likely that the individual will be selected randomly in this
process.
Every stakeholder then checks the validity of the empty block header that was initially broadcast.
Using this value they also check whether they were one of the N selected validators. The first N − 1
lucky stakeholders sign the hash of the empty block header with the private key that controls the satoshi
derived from follow-the-satoshi subroutine. Next, they broadcast their signature to the network. The N th
stakeholder then generates a wrapped block that extends the empty block header by including the desired
transactions to be verified, the N − 1 signatures, and his/her own signature for this block. The wrapped
block is finally broadcast to the network to extend the blockchain. The transaction fees that the N th
stakeholder collects from the included transactions are shared among the miner and the N participators.
From a security perspective, PoA makes the 51% attack more difficult than PoW and PoS since a large
computational power and a significant stake are both required in PoA.
Proof-of-Burn (PoB): PoB is an algorithm that achieves consensus by burning a portion of a cryptocur-
rency. Burning a portion of cryptocurrency means generating a transaction with this portion destined to an
inaccessible address by all users. The concept of burning is analogous to buying expensive computational
hardware in PoW.
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In general, a miner burns portions of his/her holdings and waits a certain period of time. This time
ensures that it is impractical for an attacker to undo the transaction. After waiting, the transaction is
permanently stored in the blockchain and becomes visible to all observers. This is proof that the potential
miner has invested a portion of his/her holdings and is worthy of being a miner. Honest miners will burn
portions of their holdings that are less than or equivalent to what they can return in the mining process
if successful. In other words, if miners burn more than what they are expected to return in a successful
mining process, they will spend more than what they earned, hence a loss.
The potential miners then create candidate blocks in an effort to extend the blockchain. By referencing
their transactions in the blockchain, they can prove that they have burnt some of their holdings earlier,
thus become accepted by the community as miners. The winning block that extends the blockchain is
chosen by allocating the miner that has burnt the most after a certain period of time.
From a security perspective, this algorithm can achieve the same security as its predecessor algorithms.
It requires a miner to perform an expensive task (burning) that is easily verified by all other participators
observing the blockchain. Similar to PoS, it saves the miners the hassle of buying hardware to physically
perform mining.
PoB is also known for its use in bootstrapping new cryptocurrencies. A new cryptocurrency can
mint its new coins by utilizing PoB. Rather than releasing mint coins during the mining process as in
PoW, a cryptocurrency can be burnt to mint coins from the new cryptocurrency. For example, a new
cryptocurrency can mint coins by burning BTC.
Whether being used to maintain consensus of a network or bootstrap an emerging cryptocurrency, PoB
has been criticized for its permanent coin destruction. This is a more critical issue for cryptocurrencies
with a limited supply. The more PoB is utilized, the less the quantity of a cryptocurrency is in circulation.
Such an issue can lead to significant inflation to the value of the cryptocurrency which can result in
destruction of the cryptocurrency.
In contrast to the chain-based algorithms discussed previously, some alternatives are based on Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithms. In these algorithms, consensus on a block is independent of the chain.
The algorithms utilize a multi-round process where every validator sends a vote for some specific block
during each round. At the end of this process, the validators reach an agreement on whether to permanently
accept a given block. These protocols could be somewhat more centralized since the validators work
together to maintain consensus by handling each block individually. For further reading, the readers are
recommended to review examples such as the ripple consensus protocol [92] and the stellar consensus
protocol [93].
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B. Altcoin Privacy
Privacy is one of the most important issues of cryptocurrencies. Some notable altcoin privacy protocols
are described below.
Zerocoin: Zerocoin [94] protocol generates anonymous coins that can be exchanged for other cryptocur-
rencies (e.g. BTC) when mixing is desired. Cryptocurrencies that embed the protocol run in parallel
with Bitcoin utilizing its blockchain. A user that wishes to mix BTC purchases this cryptocurrency
through a mint transaction. A mint transaction trades the specified amount of the cryptocurrency into
its corresponding value in the anonymous coins. Once bought, the user can convert his/her anonymous
coins back into BTC through a spend transaction. The spend transaction trades the anonymous coins
back to the original cryptocurrency. The mint transaction and the spend transaction are designed to be
uncorrelated. After a spend transaction, the user ends up with a different set of BTC than the ones
used in the mint transaction. In comparison to the mixing techniques of Bitcoin discussed previously,
Zerocoin eliminates the need for tumblers. It relies on a combination of digital commitments, one-way
accumulators, zero-knowledge proofs and the existing Bitcoin platform.
In a mint transaction, the user first generates a random serial number s and cryptographically commits
(i.e. encrypts) it into a coin c using a randomly chosen key k. The purpose of cryptographically committing
the serial number is to hide its value from all the other users while binding it to its owner. The user
then generates a Bitcoin transaction with the appropriate amount to pay for coin c (i.e. the BTC to be
mixed) and releases both of them into the network. The miners place coin c into a one-way accumulator
and mine the Bitcoin transaction into the blockchain. The transaction is not addressed to anyone and its
value remains locked in the blockchain until it is redeemed by another user in a spend transaction. At
this point, the user possesses anonymous coins equivalent to the amount of BTC that is to be mixed.
To convert the anonymous coins back to BTC, the user exchanges his/her anonymous coins with other
locked BTC of users stored on the blockchain. The user first provides zero-knowledge proof of his
cognizance of coin c in the one-way accumulator. Next, the user must prove that his key k and serial
number s correspond to coin c. The miners then verify the proof and that the serial number s has not
been previously spent. Once verified, the spend transaction is mined into the blockchain granting the
user an equivalent amount of BTC as spent in the corresponding mint transaction. The user ends up with
fresh BTC that he/she have never possessed.
However, Zerocoin protocol has a few limitations. From the perspective of the system, Bitcoin must
be soft-forked to account for the changes of the protocol. From the perspective of the protocol, the zero-
knowledge proof computed generates large signatures that would eventually bloat the blockchain. The
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process is also time-consuming and requires more time for transactions to be accepted by the system.
Most importantly, it requires a trusted party to initiate the one-way accumulator.
Shortly after the release of Zerocoin, Zerocash [95] also known as Zcash today, was introduced in
an effort to reduce the cost of the zero-knowledge proof. However, this project did not require a soft
fork to Bitcoin as Zerocoin protocol did. In fact, it was a standalone technology that implemented its
own cryptocurrency. It utilizes a smaller sized zero-knowledge proof known as zk-SNARKs [96] that
consumes less time to compute.
PrivateSend: PrivateSend is an altcoin joint transaction protocol [97] that combines identical inputs from
various users into one transaction with multiple outputs. A user initially reaches out to a random master
node requesting mixing specific denominations of a certain amount of coins. The master node then
announces that it is willing to accept other coins of identical quantities and denominations to be mixed
into a transaction. Once the master node receives enough requests, the involved users specify their full
list of inputs and outputs they wish to be mixed. The inputs specify the coins to be mixed while the
outputs specify the output addresses of users where they wish to receive the mixed coins. The master
node then puts all inputs and outputs into a joint transaction and sends it to the involved users. The users
validate the transaction and sign their inputs and return it to the master node. The master node finally
broadcasts the transaction to the network which is treated as any other transaction. However, PrivateSend
is not a completely decentralized protocol and can jeopardize the anonymity of the user since it involves
a centralized node.
CryptoNote: CryptoNote is a privacy-preserving protocol embedded in some cryptocurrency implemen-
tations that strive to hide the connection between a sender and receiver from the rest of the network [83].
The protocol protects the identity of the sender by utilizing ring signatures [98] when signing transactions.
The public key of the sender is shuffled with public keys of other senders, giving all keys equal probability
of being linked to a transaction. In this way, an attacker has no way of identifying the private key used
during transaction signing, hence identifying the sender. It also generates a unique public key for the
receiver with each new incoming transaction. Using random data generated by the sender and the public
key of the receiver, a one-time unique pair of private and public keys is generated via Diffie-Hellman
key exchange [99]. These keys are used to claim the transaction output by the receiver.
Unlike Bitcoin, the blockchains used by the cryptocurrencies running CrypoNote do not reveal the
information of transactions, hence improving anonymity. As a result, verifying transactions becomes a
challenge. To handle this issue, a modified version of the original traceable ring signature [100] is utilized.
The original scheme makes it possible to trace transactions sent by the same sender if they contain the
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same tag and are signed by the same private key. The modified scheme, referred to as one-time ring
signature, replaces the tag with a key image. The key image is deterministically derived by applying a
cryptographic hash function to the private key allowing each sender to generate only one valid signature
using his/her private key. If the sender tries to generate two different signatures with the same private
key, a link will be detected. Therefore, this scheme counters any double-spending attempts since the
blockchain will only store one signature while invalidating all others.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
After presenting our extensive survey, we recap the lessons learned and the future research directions
that can be derived from this study.
In this survey, we strived to address major technical concerns regarding the future stability of Bitcoin.
We first introduced the background of Bitcoin and explicated its major building blocks and protocols. The
main purpose of our extensive background was to educate our readers about the blockchain technology
using Bitcoin as a use case.
Next, we delved into crucial security concerns. We began by discussing the double-spending attack and
analyzed its probability of success. We showed that the probability of success can be modeled using two
different probabilistic models that result in a similar outcome. Using this analysis, we further evaluated
the profitability of the attack. We showed that attackers with less than half of the total computational
power of the system will eventually lose at some point while performing the attack. The main lesson
learned was that there will always be a trade-off between the waiting time before accepting a transaction
and the possibility of reversing the transaction. Users should realize this trade-off and only use the current
systems acknowledging these risks.
Following that, we also explored the major network-related security issues of the underlying peer-
to-peer network. Our discussion showed that these network attacks are inevitable since it is impossible
to restrict malicious nodes from connecting to the network. We further explored storage security by
investigating the wallet infrastructures and the different modes of storage. Our analysis shows that there
is also a trade-off between storage security and practicality: the more user-friendly wallets are, the bigger
risk of losing their cryptocoins. Therefore, users must take all precautions in order to protect their funds.
Beyond the security issues that Bitcoin suffers, we investigated some privacy limitations inherent to the
system. We debunked the misconception of Bitcoin anonymity and reviewed major methods for privacy
protection. Currently, systems similar to Bitcoin continue to suffer privacy issues. The privacy of the
users is at risk.
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Finally, in the last section, we also looked to expand the knowledge of the readers on some emerging
protocols that have been implemented in some altcoins. The main purpose of these protocols is to enhance
security and privacy. However, our discussion proved that even these emerging protocols have not been
able to provide good enough systems to completely eliminate the current centralized systems.
As blockchain has presented many intriguing features, most importantly decentralization, it has also
introduced new research challenges. Future research must find ways to combat these concerns in order for
the stability of blockchain to become consolidated. Based on our survey, we encourage future research
to expand on our mining profitability analysis in order to help users come to better decisions before
utilizing such systems. We believe that in order for systems such as Bitcoin to attract massive adopters,
users must clearly understand the risks and gain a certain degree of confidence.
We also believe that extensive research is required to enhance security and privacy protocols. Typical
peer-to-peer network attacks and privacy concerns such as the ones discussed in this paper can be used
to disrupt the stability of blockchain systems. Currently, all the evolving solutions may enhance the
security and/or privacy slightly, but it usually comes with a price keeping the users skeptical about using
such systems. However, as research advances in these fields, cryptocurrencies may help revolutionize the
payment system as we know it today.
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